FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-122
Friday
24 June 1994

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FBIS-EEU-94-122 *24 June 1994*

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Alia, Other Defendants Demand Acquittal

AU2406080794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] [Announcer] At today's hearing of the trial of the last Albanian communist president, Ramiz Alia, and nine top party and state officials of the communist regime, the court heard their defense counsels' summing up and the final statements by the defendants. Reporter Marash Mirashi was present in court for Albanian Television:

[Mirashi] [20-second audio outage] and gave his own explanations. After affirming the innocence of Manush Myftiu, he asked the court to reach its verdict, just as Prosecutor Fana had, in his summing up, in calling for a five-year suspended sentence.

Riza Icka, defense counsel for Adil Carcani, said practically the same thing.

Kleanthi Koci, defending former President Alia, characterized Alia's trial as unconstitutional and called for his total acquittal.

Meanwhile, Ilir Selenica, defense counsel for Rita Marko, called for a not-guilty verdict for his client. He stressed that the summing up had presented a malicious view of Marko. The prosecutor had demanded a 10-year prison sentence for Marko, while on almost the same charges, a five-year suspended sentence had been demanded for Carcani and Myftiu. In his final statement, the defendant Marko said essentially the same.

Analysts consider such cases as clear contradictions.

Roland Permeti, defense counsel for Simon Stefani, asked the court to find his client not guilty, based on the arguments that he had presented to the court.

A six-year sentence for Hekuran Isai would be very harsh, his attorney Selenica said. The charges against him are built on exaggerated statements that do not hold water.

Arben Vane, defense counsel for Aranit Cela, said that it was impossible for a lawyer such as Cela to have committed deeds that ran contrary to the law. He requested that a not-guilty verdict be passed for this defendant.

Attorneys Luan Behri, Arqile Lole, and Vladimir Bineri also requested not-guilty verdicts for defendants Zylyftar Ramizi, Rrapi Mino, and Veiz Haderi.

Chairman of the Court Celiku then asked to hear the final statements of the defendants.

The last communist president, Alia, stressed that the charges were a result of state pressure. He then converted his final statement into a political speech, similar to those of 1990-91, but this time without any applause from his devotees.

Defendant Simon Stefani submitted his final statement in writing to the court. Then the other defendants, Isai, Ramizi, Mino, Cela, and Haderi, spoke, all demanding to be acquitted.

At the end, the court withdrew to consider the verdict, which will be announced at the next hearing at 1700 [1500 GMT] on Tuesday 28 June.

Berisha, Turkey's Erkan Pledge Stronger Ties

AU2406103194 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] President of the Republic of Albania Sali Berisha received General Teoman Erkan, Turkish deputy defense minister, in a special meeting held today.

At the meeting, President Berisha pointed out the satisfactory relations with Turkey, including those in the military field. He said that the signing of the joint protocol and Erkan's visit mark progress in the military cooperation between the two countries so as to preserve peace and stability in the region.

On his part, General Erkan thanked Berisha for the reception hosted for him in Albania and said that Turkey was determined to further bolster the relations between the two armed forces.

Part II of PDDSH Political, Economic Program

AU2306130394 Tirana E DJATHTA in Albanian 17 Jun 94 p 4

[Second installment of summary of the program of the Right-Wing Democratic Party of Albania; date not given]

[Text]

The Policy of the Right-Wing Democratic Party of Albania [PDDSH] on the Functioning of the Juridical State

The PDDSH is for a complete functioning of the juridical state. The PDDSH stresses that, since the fall of the dictatorial regime, the role of the state has been to protect and coordinate the interests of the individual with those of society. In the post- dictatorial period, a powerful and rigorous state is needed to implement laws and defend the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution.

For the juridical state to function better, the PDDSH will strive to implement the following measures:

1. To restore law and order by waging a bitter struggle against criminals (theft, violation, drugs, prostitution, and hooliganism). In order to achieve this, extensive powers will be granted to the law and order forces to impose extremely severe sanctions against dereliction of duty.

2. To determine the official status of state employees by giving them necessary powers to perform their duties, decent pay according to their functions, and legal protection. Criteria to be met by state employees will also be defined, giving priority to honesty, professionalism, and the strict implementation of state laws.

3. For a better functioning of the legal state, a profound reform in the justice system is necessary. Existing legislation should be amended to include judgments by people's juries. Work will be also be carried out to purge judicial groups of people who, in the past, have participated in political trials or, during the transition period, have compromised themselves while carrying out their duties.

A profound reform in the law and order forces and the army will be carried out in order to make these bodies serve the juridical state with allegiance.

4. The PDSSH will firmly truggle against corruption, speculations, and favoritism at all levels. It will persevere with extremely severe lawful measures to discover and punish such cases.

Within this framework, a major overhaul of the customs-duty system, financial policy, tariff offices, forestry policy, state inspectorates of electricity, health services, etc. will be carried out.

5. To fully implement these laws, the PDDSH will insist that the legislation on urban area development be further improved and put into practice by guaranteeing buildings and other construction sites in conformity with technical discipline and approved plans.

6. The PDDSH supports a parliamentary republic where the three powers—legislative, executive, and juridical—are led along the fulfillment of rights set out in the Constitution. The PDDSH is, at the same time, in favor of a popular referendum on the form of regime to be established.

7. The PDDSH is for a secular state where religion is separate from the state. The PDDSH honors the rights of Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic believers to freely observe their religious endeavors.

The PDDSH will resolutely circumvent any religious sect in their attempt to capitalize on citizens' religious convictions, national interests, or democratic principles defined by the Constitution.

Thee PDDSH underscores that it will resolutely fight for the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania. The PDDSH decidedly declares itself against foreign prelates of various ranks overseeing religious organizations in Albania.

8. The PDDSH will make all necessary efforts to secure full equality among citizens, regardless of race, religion, sex, or political views.

9. The PDDSH is for a better coordination of power between central and local government bodies.

The PDDSH's policy on the National Question

1. The PDDSH will pursue its foreign policy entirely along the fulfillment and protection of aspirations, the rights and interests of the Albanian nation as a whole, and the Albanian state.

2. The PDDSH proclaims as its benevolent ideal the struggle for the resolution of the Albanian national question—that is, the unification of all detached parts of the Albanian nation and ethnic territories based on the Albanian nation's right to self-determination in accordance with the Law of Nations.

3. The PDDSH is opposed to all kinds of malicious propaganda, domestic and external, by the speculative name of "Great Albania," and it is definitely in favor of the ethnic Albania as a national state for all Albanians as a factor for peace and stability in the Balkans.

4. All efforts by the PDDSH reagrding foreign policy will serve the fulfillment of the Albanian nation's aspirations for unity. It will not accept any general or partial solution aimed at denying legitimate endeavors for unity.

5. The PDDSH is against any tendencies, political trends, or Albanian political forces that tend to present the Albanian national question as a facultative task for the Albanians, thus trying to replace nationalism with cosmopolitanism.

6. The PDDSH will strive to unite all the patriotic forces of the Albanian nation in the ethnic Albanian lands and diaspora in order to serve the cause of national unification. It will repudiate all kinds of political forces or elements who try to bring into question the Albanian nation's right to and capability for unification or manifest their tendencies to conclude agreements or cooperate with foreign powers to the detirment of the Albanian national question.

PDDSH Foreign Policy

1. In its relations with other countries, the PDDSH will pursue a serious, realistic, entirely nationalist, and open policy that firmly relies on the lessons that history has taught us, without preconceptions, or a complex of inferiority toward others, opposing unilateral concessions that are not based on the principles of mutual benefit and justice.

2. The PDDSH will strive to build and develop the Albanian state's international relations on sound and safe foundations in reasonable ways, in accordance with our country's real possilibities, and the attitude of other states and nations toward the Albanian nation and state.

3. Albania as a state and nation should decently take its place in Europe next to the other nations and states. Nationalism should not be considered as an obstacle to Albania's integration into Europe but rather a necessity

for the united Albanian nation to take its place in united Europe without any discrimination.

4. The PDDSH will strive to see that Albania, as an European country, maintains broad and cordial relations with other countries and regions of the world, especially those countries with which it has maintained ancient traditional links, spiritual and cultural affinity, and common interests and principles.

5. The PDDSH is in favor of close state relations, particularly those states and nations that are historically or actually inclined to be close friends and allies of Albania, as well as other countries and nations that show signs of goodwill toward us. The PDDSH will never aim to fuel and foment hostility toward any other nation or state, be it big or small, near or far away. What the PDSH wants is only good understanding, friendship, and useful cooperation.

6. The PDDSH will always be ready to develop close and thorough relations of good neighborliness in the Balkans and Adriactic region. It is of the opinion that relations with Italy and Turkey are fruitful and neighborly. Possiblities are increasing for relations with Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia. Relations can also be developed with nearby countries bordering on the Albanian nation, like Greece, Serbia, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and Montenegro, depending on the stand that those states maintain toward the Albanian nation's legitimate rights of the Albanian nation and toward the Republic of Kosovo. The PDDSH will always bear in mind that good-neighborly relations with those states will depend on the policy pursued by their governments.

7. The PDDSH is in favor of Albania's absolute relationship with Kosovo as two states belonging to one and the same religion and having the same political and diplomatic tasks to fulfill in the field of foreign policy and international relations. The policy of the Republic of Albania will powerfully and without any reservations support the recognition of independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo as a transitory period toward national union. The PDDSH will oppose all kinds of diplomatic plans that try to impose upon the Albanian nation in Kosovo any narrow politico-juridical, state, or juridico-international status that is contrary to the political will already expressed by their votes in the referendum on the occasion of the proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo and the elections held in Kosovo.

The PDDSH will resolutely struggle to see that Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro freely and without hindrance are able to exercise their rights until the ultimate resolution of the Albanian national question is accomplished. The PDDSH will strive that the [word indistinct] population return to their hearths and their property [in northwestern Greece] taken by force, enjoying their rights as an inseparable part of the Albanian nation.

8. The PDDSH desires and will attempt to maintain the Albanian state's close and fruitful relations friendly nations and countries like Austria, Germany, and Hungary, great democratic powers like the United States, Europe's civilized and developed countries, and Arab and all other countries.

9. The PDDSH supports the participation of Albania in universal organizations, important international bodies, and organizations of regional character. The PDDSH attaches importance to the participation of the Albanian state through relevant bodies in activities of cooperation and understanding in the Balkans, the Adriatic Sea, Europe, the Mediterranean and Black Sea, in the Conference of the Islamic Countries, and in other bodies that might be set up in the future.

10. The PDDSH proposes that the Albanian state set up a diplomatic service of genuine national physiognomy, spirit, and professional qualification that is capable of properly performing its duties toward their nation and serving the cause of the Albanian national question and its long-term mission.

11. The PDDSH will always be ready to coordinate efforts and actions and discuss them with all Albanian political forces that are sincerely in favor of a genuine foreign and national policy on the part of the Albanian state on the international policy front. However, the PDDSH will resolutely reject and repudiate any compromise that might undermine and impair the resolution of the Albanian national question, sacrifice the rights and interests of our brothers in their ethnically occupied territories, or damage the sovereignty and dignity of the Albanian nation and state.

12. The PDDSH will strive to see that Albania and the Albanians earn the world's sympathy and respect, thus achieving a good understanding but not pleading for them. It will oppose all practices of various states or international bodies that try to bring Albania under a certain degree of foreign political and juridical tutelage.

Czech Republic's Havel Ends Working Visit

AU2406090994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Report by Silviya Velikova]

[Text] Today Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, ended his brief working visit to our country. He held talks in private with President Zhelev. At the subsequent news conference, both presidents expressed satisfaction with the development of Bulgarian-Czech relations, while stressing that work in that direction should be pushed forward by various means and at various state forums. Presidents Havel and Zhelev also discussed the situation in the Balkans, the course of the democratic processes in both countries, and the development of democratic institutions in them.

Prominent Bulgarian intellectuals, Bulgarian and foreign journalists, and of course both presidents attended an official presentation to launch Vaclav Havel's book "Power of the Powerless."

Zhelev Statement on Privatization Amendments

AU2406090894 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 23 Jun 94

["Special statement" by President Zhelyu Zhelev on his decision to sign Law on Amendments to the Privatization Act—recorded]

[Text] Today President Zhelyu Zhelev signed Decree No. 141, with which he ordered that the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Act on Conversion and Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises should be published in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK. In this connection, he made the following special statement for Bulgarian National Radio and Television:

[Zhelev] I signed the Privatization Act because it is one of the most important, not to say fateful, laws for our country's development. Before deciding to sign the law, I held a broad series of meetings and talks with experts and economists from various institutions and circles with the aim of hearing their views. As a result of the talks and the views that I was able to hear, I understood that they have various objections to the content of the law itself, although as a whole most of them support mass privatization.

I also have such objections, I also have my own reservations regarding this law, but despite this I decided to let it pass, to sign it, because otherwise there is a danger of us stopping altogether one of the most important aspects of the reforms. Whereas the Restitution of Property Act affected about 3 or 4 percent of the population, and the Law on Return of Farmland affected about 70 percent of the nation, this law affects practically every single one of us. In my view, the mass privatization act, as it is popularly called, is important because of the following. First, it launches, it provides a powerful stimulus—if it is properly applied—to privatization in general, which in Bulgaria is almost at a standstill. Second, it creates a new, far wider social basis. Such an important law cannot operate effectively unless it is supported by practically the entire nation. For this to happen, one needs mass privatization that attracts the interest of the people. Third, none of the Eastern European countries that are moving along the same path were able to manage without the instrument of mass privatization. In Czechia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Russia, although the different countries achieved varying rates of success, all of them in one way or another used mass privatization as a means to intensify this process and impart a strong impulse to it.

In practice, I found myself in the situation, despite my reservations, of having to sign this law. However, for it to be a truly effective law, to prevent it proving another dead letter, in my opinion parliament must pass as a matter of urgency the bills on insolvencies and on investment funds, and also carefully consider the question whether the banks could not also be used in the role of investment funds. Second, in the subsidiary legislative and normative documents to the act, it is essential to differentiate very clearly and precisely the functions and role of the mass privatization center and the Privatization Agency, to ensure that the mass privatization in no way hampers the other forms of market privatization. Last, but not least, we need a strong government that has the will, energy, and courage to carry out the privatization. The law itself, however perfect it may be, cannot achieve anything.

Accordingly, I had to choose between signing a not completely perfect law on mass privatization and the prospect of Bulgaria not having any mass privatization at all. I prefered to sign.

SDS Deputies 'Infringe' Parliamentary Boycott

AU2306172794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] The parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] decided on its own judgment to infringe the parliamentary boycott because of the bill on amending the Law on Rehabilitation Victims of Repressions. Stefan Savov, the group's chairman, told our reporter Antoaneta Puncheva that when a decision—he clearly had the boycott in mind—proves to be wrong, it has to revoked.

Savov has not received any official reaction from the SDS National Coordinating Council to the parliamentary group's decision, which was reached yesterday. The coalition's political organ will discuss the decision at its meeting on Tuesday [28 June]. Stefan Savov also denied the rumor that he is supposed to become prime minister during the term of the present parliament, implying he will be prime minister of a caretaker cabinet. I have a big party behind me, he said; I am not the kind of politician fit to serve in a caretaker cabinet.

Rasheeva Quits SDS 'Clean Past Commission'

AU2406102694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0800 GMT 24 Jun 94

[Report by Vladislav Stoychev on today's session of National Assembly in Sofia—live]

[Excerpt] First, a sensational piece of news: National Assembly Deputy Veselina Rasheeva has resigned from the chairmanship of the commission popularly known as the Clean Past Commission, which answers to the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council. The commission is responsible for carrying out Paragraph 4 of the decision of the Sixth SDS National Conference, aimed at uncovering former members of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], leading members of the BCP nomenklatura, and members of the Active Fighters Against Fascism Union who have found their way into the SDS structures.

Ms. Rasheeva's reasons for her resignation are that the National Coordinating Council is disregarding the commission's recommendations and, moreover, an instruction has been issued in the council's name that the "clean past" Paragraph 4 should be implemented selectively. Ms. Rasheeva will continue to serve as a member of the commission. [passage omitted]

Coal Miners Mount Protest Rally in Sofia

AU2406091094 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Today coal miners belonging to the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria] and Podkrepa held a protest rally in Aleksandur Nevski Square in Sofia. Representatives of working collectives from the pits in Maritsa- Iztok, Troyanovo-1, -2, and -3, the briquette factory in Gulubovo, and mines in Pernik, Bobovdol, and elsewhere. The miners put forward demands for protecting the national coal-mining industry and the drafting of a clear concept for its future development. They also demanded the immediate restarting of the briquette factory in Gulubovo, which provides fuel for more than 2,000 families, and the exemption of its production from value added tax, which makes it output unsalable.

According to a press release issued by the Council of Ministers Press Center, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov and Nikita Shervashidze, chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, met with representatives of the striking coal miners and power industry workers. On behalf of the strikers, the representatives handed Prof. Berov a declaration containing their demands. The strikers' representatives were briefed on the measures adopted today by the government to ensure the financial stabilization of the energy industry until the introduction of a mechanism for periodically updating the prices of energy products.

Havel Adviser Plays Down Stability Conference

BR2605151794 Paris LE FIGARO in French
26 May 94 p 4

[Interview with Prince Karl Schwarzenberg, chief of Czech President Havel's Cabinet, by Xavier Gautier; place and date not given: "The 'Good Intentions' of the Balladur Plan"]

[Text] *Karl Schwarzenberg, chief of President Vaclav Havel's personal Cabinet since 1989 and heir to a long line of Austro-Hungarian prince-diplomats, remains, one year after the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, the closest adviser to the father of the "Velvet Revolution." Now living in Prague, this Vienna-educated prince is one of the most committed spokesmen voicing the hopes and frustrations of Central Europe with regard to Brussels' partial opening up to the new democracies.*

[Gautier] What are your views on the Conference on Stability that opens today in Paris and that will attempt to solve the problems of good-neighborliness between the countries of Central Europe?

[Schwarzenberg] Can you imagine a roundtable organized in Biscay, in the French Basque country, organized so that France, Spain, Ireland, and Britain could discuss the Basque and Irish problems under the benevolent supervision of the Czechs and the Americans? No? Neither can I.

[Gautier] But doesn't the "Balladur plan" provide the new democracies with a forum to talk about their problems?

[Schwarzenberg] All this reminds me of the story concerning my great grandfather, a very wise man who lived in the last century. One day he was introduced to some very pretty girls with the aim of getting him to marry one of them. "She is superb," he said, "she will be perfect for my best friend." Well, Mr. Balladur's plan is doubtless superb, but it is solely suited to his best friend.

[Gautier] Seen from Prague, does this conference appear destined to fail?

[Schwarzenberg] Let me return to my hypothetical "Biscay" roundtable. If it were a roundtable, we would have had to prepare for the Conference on Stability in Europe to get down to some long-term work, especially because by exposing our intimate problems for all the world to see we risk opening a new Pandora's box. The founding fathers of the "Stability Pact" do not have solid experience of the problems in our part of Europe.

[Gautier] France and its European neighbors have not, however, spared any efforts to understand the situation in Central Europe.

[Schwarzenberg] Karl Kraus, the Austrian author of *Last Days of Humanity*, once wrote: "Good intentions are the opposite of good politics."[1] I think that this conference was put together by bureaucrats who had plenty of good intentions but whose spirit was too Cartesian. The Europeans will soon run up against prejudices that are deeply rooted in the spirits of their interlocutors. In our part of the world, resentment goes way back in history.

[Gautier] In this connection, the Czech Republic, the United States, and even Moscow have been asked to play a mediating role at this conference. Is that not the beginning of a good idea?

[Schwarzenberg] In a pinch, the Baltic problem could be compared to the Basque problem. However, if the Russian Federation sits down at the negotiating table as a mediator—and what other role could it play?—it will run into opposition from the Baltic countries, which is understandable.

[Gautier] Is not your pessimism out of place when one observes the way in which Europe successfully offered a status to South Tyrol, which is disputed by Austria and Italy?

[Schwarzenberg] Of course, but the issue of South Tyrol was limited. It demanded the commitment of two neighbors, both members of the European Community [as published].

[Gautier] What do you think the chances are of saving the Paris Conference?

[Schwarzenberg] The kind of problem the conference is studying cannot be resolved with great pomp. France cites the example of the Madrid conference on the Middle East, but Madrid did not yield anything. Only the Oslo negotiations, which were held in secret and spread out over two years, resulted in the agreements on Jericho and Gaza.

[Gautier] Speaking of your Slovak neighbor, the problem of the Hungarian minority seemed like a riddle a month ago. Yet, Jozef Moravcik, the new prime minister, has just submitted a bill protecting minority rights, without the help of the Europeans. What does Prague think about that?

[Schwarzenberg] The new government in Bratislava has, thank God, taken the exact opposite course of its predecessor's policies. It has decided to tackle the problems of minorities in a pragmatic way. The Slovak Government now needs support not just from its neighbors, but also from Europe as a whole.

Footnote

1. Karl Kraus was one of the journalists most feared by the Austro-Hungarian government early in this century.

BIS Head on Control of Intelligence Services

AU2306195994 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 20 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Stanislav Devaty, director of the Security and Information Service, by Jan Bednar; place and date not given: "Intelligence Services Should Be Controlled by the Government and Parliament"]

[Text] *Parliamentary committees last week debated the government bill on the Security and Information Service (BIS) and also an "umbrella" law on all intelligence services of the Czech Republic. The existing law on BIS is valid until the end of the first half of this year, and, therefore, a new law has to be adopted. We have asked interim BIS Director Stanislav Devaty, who defended the bill in parliament, to what extent the new laws will be of benefit to the work of intelligence services.*

[Devaty] Parliament has decided that the system of intelligence services should be regulated by a law. This law should apply to all intelligence services because, until now, we have had a comprehensive law on BIS only. Parliament has decided that a new concept for intelligence services will be created. New special regulations for each service should be built on this concept. Ours has been drafted. Of course, it is difficult to invent something new in the sphere of intelligence services, but we have drafted this bill using our own experience and foreign experience.

[Bednar] According to the bill, the government wants to take over the control of intelligence services, apart from giving them assignments. Have you not been satisfied with the existing way of control?

[Devaty] I have said it about a hundred times: I am not against control at all. On the contrary, I welcome any kind of control. In principle, I am only against control bodies having access to open cases. We have a sort of gentleman's agreement with the control body: I am willing to let them have access to any operation any time, but such an operation must be closed first. The problem is that our responsibility should be balanced. That is, if I open records on something, I must have a very good reason for it. One cannot have access to an operation in progress without having a reason or just because someone says so. Someone must bear responsibility for the operation being stopped. Deputies must be aware of the fact that it may have serious consequences if, having access to our work, they prevent a certain operation from continuing.

[Bednar] Has full responsibility been transferred to the government whose task is to control you, then?

[Devaty] Control should be divided between the government and parliament. As long as the government is to be responsible for the activity of the [intelligence] services, it also has to have a chance of controlling this service in some way. This is logical. Now, we have to find a balance between the government's interference in the work of the [intelligence] services and parliament's access to their activity.

[Bednar] Does it trouble you that you have not been appointed BIS director permanently?

[Devaty] To be sincere, it does bother me quite a lot, not so much because of myself but because it means, in fact, permanent "uncertainty within the firm." In view of the fact that I have already been two years with BIS, that this "firm" has developed in a certain way, and that we even implemented a certain concept, I believe that it does not much contribute to the security of the people who are employed there if no permanent director has been appointed. Before me, there were seven directors there. Such changes are not to the benefit of the service, in the same way that they would not be to the benefit of any other organization.

[Bednar] Does this obstruct reconstruction of the service?

[Devaty] We are trying to eliminate the influence of this fact on the reconstruction of the service, but we can feel that people are insecure. Each director brings his own ideas, and this means certain changes to the intelligence service, a shock. The intelligence service has been through so many shocks it needs a period of peace, in my opinion. We already have arrived at a certain model, and now we need at least two years of peace to be able to develop our activity.

[Bednar] Why has the decision on the director still not been made?

[Devaty] I do not know. The government, as well as parliament, have their say in the matter—still according to the old law. The fact is that I have been appointed precisely according to the law. I was proposed by the government at that time, the appropriate parliamentary committee discussed the proposal, and I was appointed by the Czech National Council Presidium. Unfortunately, they used the word "interim." Why this still is the case, I do not know.

SIPRI Arms-Export Analysis Criticized

AU2306134894 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 21 Jun 94 p 16

[Article by CTK and "(gag)": "We Did Not Deliver Tanks to Pakistan"]

[Text] Prague/Stockholm—The $0.5 billion that, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Czech Republic was supposed to have made in arms exports last year corresponds to the 1986 boom in Czechoslovak arms exports. Never before—or since—had we achieved such a large turnover.

The Czech Trade and Industry Ministry says that the value of the realized contracts in arms exports in 1993

amounted to $167 million. Stanislav Fritzl, an employee in its licensing administration, told us that the general analyses conducted by the Stockholm institute are renowned; however, there are inconsistencies between its figures and the figures of the countries that export arms. The same institute stated recently that we exported tanks to Pakistan, although only an informative meeting on the possibility of supplying them had been held. The contract fell through in the end. "If, in their analysis of Czech arms exports, the Swedes applied the same method, incorporating deliveries that were not made or even the tentative contacts made by manufacturers, I am not surprised at the difference between their and our figures," said Fritzl. According to him, the Czech Trade and Industry Ministry will ask the Stockholm institute to reveal how it reached the sum of $0.5 billion. The Czech Republic is an important exporter of small arms (Czech Arms Plants Uhersky Brod) and jet training aircraft (Aero Vodochody), while the Vlasim-based Sellier and Bellot or Tatra Koprivnice, whose once ambitious military production is being phased out, however, are among the companies with good prospects.

Stanislav Fritzl told us that the Czech Republic is no longer viewed by the West as an armed-to-the-teeth opponent; nevertheless, it is viewed as a competent rival in the production of quality arms. Fritzl described as speculation the theory put forward by LIDOVE NOVINY that the Stockholm institute's report, which ranks us as the sixth-largest arms exporter, could be aimed at casting doubt on the Czech Republic's credibility. Nevertheless, he did admit that very tough competition, whose methods are not always clean, is taking place among the competing arms plants. The case involving the six impounded Aero Vodochody guns, in which both Aero and the Cechofracht forwarding company made minor mistakes, probably does not fall into this category. However, the Austrians could use these minor mistakes to seek a legal solution to the multimillion [currency not specified] shipment for Thailand.

Cechofracht and Aero agreed yesterday to end the mutual accusations over who is responsible for the seizure of the guns. The forwarding company has claimed that the guns were declared only as spare parts for L-59 aircraft. On the other hand, Aero's director has told LIDOVE NOVINY that, without the gun carriage, the guns are just a piece of iron comparable to a spare part.

Foreign Interest in Economic Cooperation Outlined

AU2306161394 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 21 Jun 94 pp 1, 21

[Article by Miroslav Prchal: "Czech Transformation Experiences Are Attracting Interest in Economic Relations"]

[Text] Czech experiences of successful and rapid economic transformation are attracting interest in developing economic and commercial cooperation with our country. This was confirmed by the series of meetings held by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and Ministers Ivan Kocarnik and Karel Dyba at the end of last week, during the international economic forum in the Swiss town of Crans-Montana.

Economy Minister Karel Dyba described his exchange of views with Vietnamese representatives as very friendly. "Vietnam, which will obviously be the next 'tiger' in Southeast Asia, with a market of almost 100 million inhabitants, is an enormously interesting country for all industrially advanced states. There is an uninterrupted flow of Taiwanese and Japanese businessmen who are making their way there. The Vietnamese officials emphasized our longstanding cooperation, and I had the feeling from our talks that they would be happy for it to continue," he told HOSPODARSKE NOVINY. In reply to a question from HOSPODARSKE NOVINY on whether the Czech Republic has a chance of asserting itself there, in a situation where various advanced states are now investing heavily in his country, the secretary general of the Vietnamese Council for Foreign Trade, Nguyen Trung [name as published], said: "Absolutely certainly. Our economic relations have a good tradition, and the prospects for our cooperation, even after the recent turbulent years, are promising. Our two countries have distinct comparative advantages. We have a very cheap labor force, and your technology, because of its low cost compared with Western states, is capable of competing solidly. Together we can produce high quality products, and, given our lower overheads, we can assert ourselves well on world markets."

Following his talks with his Croatian counterpart, Nikica Valentic, V. Klaus said that Croatia is immensely interested in expanding economic relations with the Czech Republic, especially in increasing the exchange of goods. "This country returns a number of positive results, which, irrespective of the state of war in the region, indicate that the situation there is consolidating," he added. Prime Minister Nikica Valentic expressed his conviction that this year's anticipated invasion of Czech tourists in Croatia will certainly have a favorable influence on the development of economic relations with the Czech Republic.

Apropos his talks with Ukrainian Economy Minister Roman Shpek, Minister K. Dyba told HOSPODARSKE NOVINY that they mainly discussed the possibilities for capitalizing our outstanding claims and for our entry into the privatization process in Ukraine. The Ukrainian representative promised to provide our government with a data base of the enterprises that are open as shareholding companies for the entry of foreign investors. "This could be an interesting offer for some of our large companies, although there are certain risks there that anyone interested in investing must weigh. There was obvious interest from the Ukrainian side," he stated. In an interview for HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, Shpek

expressed his hope that our economic and commercial relations will flourish and that their volume will increase. According to him, "it is true, obviously, of all countries transferring to a market economy that, during the first phase, they break off their economic relations with their former partners and strive to assert themselves on Western markets. We are also seeking good fortune in the West, but, even so, during the course of reform, we should take advantage of the fact that there used to be traditional cooperation between us on various levels, including the enterprise level, and we should base it on mutual advantageousness and productivity. Ukraine and the Czech Republic, for example, cooperated well in engineering and the metallurgical industry. Your technology for the consumer industry had a large market in our country. I think that words like 'East' and 'West' should not be decisive in trade; after all, the important thing is its advantageousness."

Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus held meetings in Crans-Montana with leading representatives from some of the countries of the former Soviet Union—Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Belarus. He said: "It is remarkable that these countries see a model for themselves in the reform path along which the Czech Republic is going. We even reached a firm agreement on sending to Moldova and Georgia a mission of our experts who will give advice there on the whole logic of the transformation process." He added that he received an official request for this from the Moldovan president and the Georgian prime minister. "I think it can only be in our interest to make use of it," said V. Klaus.

Hungarian Businessmen Seeking Markets in CR

94CH0280C Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 May 94 p 20

[Article by Vaclav Lavicka: "Hungarian Businessmen Would Very Much Like To Expand Their Marketing Possibilities, Even in the Czech Republic"]

[Text] *Between 24 and 29 May, more than 30 firms from the northern Hungarian region of Nograd will introduce themselves at Prague's U Hybernu Palace. The project is supported by the Budapest Ministry for Foreign Economic Contacts.*

Recently, Hungary has been attempting to revive commercial flow among Central European countries and, of course, to find new markets. The fact that Hungarian manufacturers have something to offer could be verified by several Czech journalists in recent days. Their journey led them not to Budapest but, rather, to northern Hungarian rural areas, specifically to the region of Nograd, which borders the Slovak Republic.

The region, with its 230,000 inhabitants, is one of the smallest in the Hungarian Republic. Its center is at Salgotarjan, which has a population of approximately 50,000. "We are greatly interested in having Hungarian and Czech businessmen get to know each other better and establishing mutually beneficial contacts. That is why we have decided to introduce our region, our firms, and their products in Prague," stated Ferenc Korill, chairman of the General Assembly for the region of Nograd, during a news conference.

Neither he nor any other officials from the region and representatives of local firms there, who met with Czech journalists, made a secret of the fact that the economy of the region is currently wasting away. The extraction of brown coal has been halted, and metallurgy and steelmaking (which was, at one time, the backbone of the regional economy) are in deep crisis because they were oriented toward a single principal market. Unemployment in the region affects more than 20 percent of all jobs (the national average is 12.2 percent).

Agriculture in the region has outstanding natural conditions, primarily for the raising of fruit, vegetables, and potatoes. Other developmental opportunities are provided by the riches of the forests, and there are even possibilities for tourism. But, much as is the case elsewhere, there is a lack of investments, not only for modernizing production, but also for investments in the weak infrastructure (the highway network, communications, sources of potable water, the ecology).

"Foreign investors are not exactly rushing into the crisis regions in Hungary. I would say that their interests end at the Danube River—in other words, primarily in western Hungary," noted F. Korill. In his estimation, the region receives about 1 percent of all foreign investments placed in Hungary (toward the end of 1992, the region received 4 billion forints).

Prague will be visited from the Nograd region not only by firms that have already traded with Czech partners, but also by those who have thus far "cultivated" no foreign contacts. Of course, the region also has firms (which have been fully or partially privatized) that already have the worst behind them—some have even highly successfully penetrated into western markets. They would very much like to try it in the Czech Republic.

The presentation by Hungarian firms from the region that is economically wasting away but that has not resigned itself to this fate enjoys official support: The Budapest Ministry for Foreign Economic Contacts has allocated 7.5 million forints for this purpose.

Let us add that, in the Prague U Hybernu Palace and the Hungarian Cultural Center in Prague, not only will firms and their products be introduced, but also folk art from the region, its rich history, and examples of its contemporary social life.

GDP Decline Said Halted in 1993

94CH0280B Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Apr 94 p 7

[Article by vac: "Last Year, the Decline in the Gross Domestic Product Was Halted"]

[Text] According to the expectations and estimates of the most important economists, including even members of the Economic Council of Ministers, the decline in the gross domestic product [GDP] stopped in 1993. When compared with 1992, it reached the level of 99.7 percent—that is to say, it was 0.3 percent lower. HOSPODARSKE NOVINY has already reported on these fundamental preliminary data issued by the Czech Statistical Office. In more detailed materials, the Czech Statistical Office notes that the figures for 1992 and 1993 have been rendered extensively more accurate. According to these materials, the GDP for 1993 attained a value of 923.1 billion korunas [Kc]—that is, approximately Kc89,400 per capita. Other facts that were reported regarding these computations by the statistical authorities are also of interest. The implicit deflator (the cumulative price index) of the GDP attained a level of 115.3 points. For purposes of comparison, it is possible to state that the measure of inflation, computed on the basis of the consumer price index (a sliding average for 12 months compared with the same period a year ago), reached a 1993 level of 120.8 percent.

From the standpoint of aggregate demand, the slight decline in the GDP was brought about by the gross creation of fixed capital (by declining by 7.9 percent), whereas all other components increased: Consumption by households increased by 1.5 percent and consumption by the government by 1.1 percent, and the asset portion of the foreign trade balance rose 44 percent. A decline in inventories and reserves (approximately 6 percent of the total volume of the GDP) in 1993 was approximately equal to the level of 1992.

There was a more express rise in some expenditure components of the GDP (computed in current prices). The share of household consumption rose from 51.5 percent in 1992 to 54.2 percent in 1993, government consumption increased from 23.1 percent to 25.7 percent, and the positive balance of foreign trade rose from 1.2 percent to 3.1 percent. On the other hand, there was a decline in the share accounted for by gross capital formation from 24.7 percent to 23.3 percent. There was a specific increase in the share of inventory and reserve decline, which dropped from - 0.7 percent to - 6.3 percent.

Social Security To Increase by End of 1994

94CH0280E Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 30 Apr 94 p 1

[Article based on announcement at news conference by Jindrich Vodicka, minister of labor and social affairs: "Toward the End of the Year, Social Security Payments Will Rise"]

[Text] *Prague—An increase in social security transfers, including pensions, is being readied by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. This adjustment should come about during the fourth quarter of this year. At yesterday's news conference, this was announced by Minister Jindrich Vodicka.*

Measures being readied for families with children will have to do with adjustment of the additional payments for children (the ministry anticipates an increase of between 40 and 50 korunas [Kc] a month), adjustments in the state equalization contribution for foster children (it will rise approximately by Kc200 for a family operating within the one-and-one-half and double multiple of the minimum living costs in terms of their income). The adjustment figures on increasing support payments for the birth of a child (by Kc500) and on increasing the parental contribution. The ministry is also proposing increasing burial payments by approximately Kc2,000; adjusting the contribution for wives and children of soldiers (by approximately Kc100); the contribution toward the expenses for quarters for a soldier (by approximately 10 percent); and payments supporting alimentation and other basic requirements of citizens who depend on catering services (by approximately Kc100).

The above amounts are still to be discussed by the government. But the minister was not expecting any fundamental changes in the amounts he proposes. He is also proposing the valorization of pensions, which should also come about in the fourth quarter but will most likely occur a month later. The valorization is to be made up of two portions according to the proposal. The state equalization contribution is to be valorized first, which means that all pensioners would receive an additional payment of Kc220. Next, pensions are to be increased by 5 percent. On average, pensions should rise by Kc360, which, according to Minister Vodicka, represents a 12-percent rise in pensions.

Kovac on Intensifying U.S., Hungarian Relations

AU2306172194 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Jun 94 pp 1, 6

[TA SR Washington dispatch: "Arpad Goncz and Michal Kovac Want To Contribute to Building Good-Neighborly Relations"]

[Text] Washington—"We have managed to introduce a certain calm into society in Slovakia. The government has started to work systematically and more conceptually, without regard for the fact that its mandate expires by the time of the elections in September," Slovak President Michal Kovac told the TA SR correspondent after his arrival in Washington.

He said that the first five months of the year indicate a certain economic growth, even though this phenomenon could be only temporary. An agreement with the IMF has been reached, and an agreement with the World Bank is in the offing, which bears out that the experts of these institutions have become convinced that the internal political stability is positively reflected also in the government's economic work.

Commenting on the intensification of relations between Slovakia and the United States, Michal Kovac said that he perceives them within the framework of the U.S. interest in the Central European region [sentence as published]. According to the president, the increased domestic stability in Slovakia also contributes to this because it was precisely after the change in government that a number of important bilateral visits were realized.

"I see the Institute for East-West Studies [IEWS] prize as a token of appreciation from an important international institution for the fact that the Slovak president, aside from dealing with various domestic political problems, initiated a dialogue with representatives of the Hungarian minority and Hungarian President Arpad Goncz," President Kovac told the TA SR correspondent.

"It is a token of appreciation for not only my policy but also the policy of all of the political forces that currently seek the establishment of good, friendly relations between Hungary and Slovakia. I am thinking also of the present coalition government, which has already taken a number of accommodating steps in this direction," Kovac said.

The president went on to say that, together with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, they realize the great importance of achieving historical reconciliation between Hungary and Slovakia. "As long as we hold our present posts, we will do everything within our power so that Hungarian-Slovak relations become relations between two good, friendly neighbors," the Slovak president stressed.

Existence of Meciar 'Intelligence Agency' Denied

AU2306134994

[Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 22 June on pages 1 and 2 carries a 900-word interview with Jaroslav Svechota, former deputy minister of interior, by Julius Gembicky entitled "Jaroslav Svechota: I Do Not Own a Firm That Would Shadow Politicians for Vladimir Meciar." In the interview, which was held in a Bratislava cafe on 21 June, Svechota responds to an interview given by Ludovit Cernak, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and chairman of the National Democratic Party, to the 17 June issue of the East Slovak regional daily SLOVENSKY VYCHOD, claiming that a private firm run by Svechota was acting as an "information and intelligence agency" for former Prime Minister Meciar.

In the interview, Svechota asserts that he does not know anything about the existence of such a firm. He tells the interviewer that he is a partner in only two private firms, one "dealing with agricultural production on restituted land in the Dunajska Streda district" and the other a building firm, which, however, "does not engage in any activity and does not have even one koruna of turnover or profit." Asked how the suspicion of his involvement in such a firm could arise, Svechota says: "It may have its origin in Czech dailies, where a report appeared that I was behind Vladimir Meciar's intelligence service. It is a fabrication. I am engaged in neither intelligence nor shadowing people." Svechota also denies that he has engaged in any such activity at any time since leaving the Ministry of Interior.

Asked about Cernak's possible motives for his assertions in the SLOVENSKY VYCHOD interview, Svechota says: "We could find a reply to this if we analyzed Mr. Cernak's contacts and ascertained from where he might have such findings. But I really do not know what his motives are." Pressed by the interviewer to say what he means by Cernak's "contacts," Svechota then says: "I would not want to go into detail."

In conclusion, Svechota announces that he is going to sue both the publisher of SLOVENSKY VYCHOD and Cernak.

Moravcik Confident of Coalition Electoral Victory

AU2406083594 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Jun 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Moravcik Expects the Present Coalition To Be Victorious in the Elections"]

[Text] Bratislava—One hundred days before the elections, Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik is confident that the coalition parties making up the present government will be victorious. "We must convince our people that it is possible to govern without Meciar in Slovakia," the acting Slovak prime minister told the Austrian APA agency in an interview.

According to Moravcik, the evolution of the political orientation of citizens in Slovakia has not yet ended. "It is deplorable that as much as 30 percent of Slovakia's population still leans toward parties with extremist tendencies. Although there is not much time left before the extraordinary elections, I suppose that many of these citizens could still be persuaded not to vote for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) or the Slovak National Party (SNS). At any rate, Meciar's HZDS should not emerge from the fall elections victorious. In the event of an electoral fiasco of his party, Meciar would perhaps leave the Slovak political stage forever because he is not the type of politician who would be ready or able to wait four years for his next chance."

In the economic sphere, the Slovak prime minister reckons that there will soon be an increase of taxes. He hopes, however, that the citizens of Slovakia will have understanding for these government measures, all the more so because his Cabinet is planning to raise pensions in the interest of alleviating the social consequences [of the tax hikes].

Produce Imports Eased; Foreign 'Pressure' Blamed

AU2306161694

[Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 22 June on page 1 carries a 300-word "eb"-signed report entitled "Foreign Certificates Will Suffice as of 1 July for Imports of Fruit and Vegetables." According to the report, the Slovak Office for Normalization, Metrology, and Testing issued a decree on 21 June, under which, with effect from 1 July, importers of fruit and vegetables will no longer have to produce a quality certificate issued by the Slovak testing authority. The above decision is also the subject of a 650-word Stefan Mistrik commentary, entitled "Inadmissible Concession," in Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 22 June on pages 1 and 4.

The NARODNA OBRODA report notes that, as of 1 July, Slovakia will recognize certificates issued by the OECD, the European Union [EU], or the "certification authority" accredited in the country from which the goods come. The Slovaks reportedly took this "accommodating step" on the basis of a protocol on the recognition of OECD certificates that was signed by Minister of Agriculture Koncos and the EU "at the beginning of June." NARODNA OBRODA notes that the previous requirement for a Slovak certificate "had greatly complicated and, as a result, drastically limited imports of fruit and vegetables, including those that do not grow in Slovakia or of which there is shortage." According to the paper, importers welcome the new decree as a "step that will move us closer to the practices used in fruit and vegetable trade in the world."

Stefan Mistrik opens the commentary by saying: "The Slovak agricultural public has the right to be enraged. On 10 June 1994, Minister of Agriculture Pavol Koncos yielded to the European Union commissioner during talks on the recognition of OECD and EU states' certificates for imports of selected types of fruit and vegetables. This is an inadmissible concession, whose consequences for the Slovak economy are scarcely calculable today. We have opened wide the doors of the Slovak agricultural market, creating conditions for its inundation with imported vegetables and fruit."

According to Mistrik, OECD and EU certificates for the following items will be recognized as of 1 July: potatoes, tomatoes, onions, garlic, cabbage, broccoli, cauliflower, carrots, cucumbers, green peppers, bananas, citrus fruit, grapes, watermelons and cantaloupes, apples, pears, apricots, peaches, cherries, as well as nuts and frozen fruit. According to Mistrik, this measure will put Slovak growers at a disadvantage because their produce will still have to meet strict domestic norms.

Because Minister Koncos "yielded to the pressure of EU commissioners," Mistrik continues, "the Czechs can laugh because they have now achieved what they did not achieve in direct talks with Slovakia only a few weeks ago. What they wanted has been accomplished for them by EU commissioners."

Besides expressing concern at the "millions of korunas of which Slovak farmers will be deprived" as a result of the new decree, Mistrik is also worried about its impact on citizens' health: "The question arises about the place of the Slovak citizen in all this. His government does not protect his health. Last year our inspection authorities ascertained that our market is flooded with food that is damaging to health. In some cases, substandard quality goods made up 70 percent of the imported volume."

Poll on Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform

AU2406083094 Bratislava SME in Slovak 22 Jun 94 p 4

[Article by Ondrej Dostal: "A Well-Balanced Sheet"]

[Text] The results of the public opinion survey that the FOCUS agency carried out in May register, among other things, the population's views on selected problems that are illustrative of attitudes on the right-center-left scale.

A total of 7.1 percent of respondents identified themselves clearly as being on the left, 14.9 percent as leaning toward the left, 44.1 percent as leaning toward the center, 13.1 percent as leaning toward the right, and 6.7 percent as being clearly on the right. What is evident, apart from the numerical equality between "right-wingers" and "left-wingers," is the clear dominance of those who profess allegiance to the political center. However, this position in the center does not have the character of consistent and unambiguous centrist positions but, rather, is a combination of right-wing and left-wing attitudes.

In relation to the general economic transformation, proreform attitudes and approaches that can be considered right-wing have a surprisingly strong representation. As many as 45.9 percent of respondents are of the opinion that the pace of the economic reform should be faster, and 25.3 percent consider its pace adequate. On the other hand, 13.7 percent advocate the slowing down of the reform, and only 2.3 percent want the reform to be halted. More than one-half of respondents (52.8 percent) agree with the privatization of the largest possible number of companies, while 35.3 percent are of the opposite opinion.

Those polled in the FOCUS survey expressed a relatively favorable attitude toward private entrepreneurs—41.3 percent advocate a reduction of the entrepreneurs' tax burden, compared with 17.7 percent who would like to see their tax burden rise. The opinion that companies and firms should be given the opportunity to give a part of their taxes directly in support of health care, education, culture, sports, and the like is supported by 60.6 percent of those polled, while only 21.1 percent want taxes to be surrendered exclusively directly into the state budget. Views on the terms of the payment of unemployment benefits reveal a similar pattern—59.9 percent want them to be tightened, while 14.8 percent want them to be less stringent.

On some other questions (and it needs to be said that these questions have a more immediate impact on the respondents' lives), views gravitate more toward the center. For example, 41.2 percent advocate the existence of a single type of health and social insurance for everyone, while approximately the same number (41.4 percent) prefer the possibility to choose from various types of health and social insurance according to one's own choice and level of income. The view that the state should provide child allowances regardless of the level of parents' income is supported by 40.3 percent; 26.7 percent believe that they should be paid only to families living at the subsistence level, while 30.5 percent are somewhere in between these two options.

However, all of the previous seemingly protransformation figures are called in question somewhat by the fact that as many as 47.2 percent disagree with the view that the changes in the economy must be made as quickly as possible, even at the cost of temporarily lowering living standards. On the other hand, 45 percent agree with this view. Given the erstwhile massive shock over "belt-tightening," this division into two almost equally strong halves is not all that tragic, however.

The most extreme antireform attitudes appear at the most general level. As many as 67.8 percent believe that income differentials should be reduced, with which only 27.9 percent disagree. As many as 82.8 percent agree with the view that people in our country are growing rich predominantly by dishonest means, as against 14.6 percent who disagree with this view.

On the other hand, also positive tendencies are to be observed at the rather general plane, which cannot be quite unequivocally assessed in terms of right-wing or left-wing attitudes. The view that Slovakia should follow as much as possible the example of the advanced countries of the West is supported by 66.6 percent, while only 25.9 percent voiced disagreement with this view.

On the whole, the sheet is thus well-balanced.

Unemployment Declines to 13.89 Percent in May

AU2406083194 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 22 Jun 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Unemployment Declined in May; in Eleven Districts, One in Five People Is Jobless"]

[Text] Bratislava—The decline in the number of unemployed, which began this February, continued in May. At the end of May, labor offices had on record 354,000 job seekers, 7,063 fewer than the month before. The unemployment rate was 13.89 percent and was 0.28 percentage points lower than at the end of April. In 11 districts of the Slovak Republic, the rate of unemployment exceeded 20 percent, and, in another 11 districts, it was higher than 15 percent. According to data provided by the Employment Services Administration, the rate of unemployment declined in all districts of the Slovak Republic, with the exception of Nitra, Martin, Rimavska Sobota, Velky Krtis, and Kosice-Environs.

The Bratislava City (4.09 percent), Kosice-City (9.67 percent), and Trencin (7.07 percent) districts continue to have the lowest rate of unemployment. The highest rate of unemployment remains in the districts of Rimavska Sobota (26.10 percent), Kosice-Environs (22.75 percent), and Spisska Nova Ves (22.23 percent). The relatively most marked decrease of unemployment was registered in May in the districts of Cadca, Trencin, Bardejov, and Svidnik.

Labor offices in the Slovak Republic newly registered 20,568 job seekers in May and crossed off the names of 27,631 persons from their registers, 6,707 of whom (24.3 percent) were placed through the mediation of labor offices. There were 35 job seekers for each vacant job at the end of May. The development of unemployment is favorably influenced by the seasonal factor: The number of job opportunities in agriculture, construction, and tourism goes up during the summer.

Opposition Deputies Named To Fill Positions

AU2406083694 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Jun 94 p 4

[Correspondents' report: "Laszlo Kover Will Be Head of the Fidesz Parliamentary Group Until September—Boross To Chair the National Security Committee"]

[Text] Yesterday the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] nominated Laszlo Salamon, former deputy head of the MDF group in the parliament, to the position of chairman of the parliament's Constitutional Committee. Peter Nahimi has been nominated to the only parliament clerk position the MDF can fill. Peter Boross, departing prime minister, has been nominated to the position of chairman of the parliament's National Security Committee. The MDF also obtained a chairman position in the Budget Committee: Bela Kadar, former minister of International Economic Relations, will chair this committee.

According to the six-party agreement, the MDF is entitled to four deputy committee chairman positions. Thus, the position of deputy chairman of the Constitutional Committee will be filled by Katalin Kutrucz, a former member of the committee; Gyorgy Csoti will become deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee; the position of deputy chairman of the Cultural Committee will be filled by the previous chairman Attila Zsigmond, and departing minister of Transportation Gyorgy Schamschula will be the deputy chairman of the Auditing Committee.

At the founding session of the new parliamentary group of the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz] held on 22 June, Lszlo Kover was given the task to head the Fidesz group until September 1994. The deputies accepted the proposal of the party leadership to refrain from selecting a new parliamentary group head for the time being, because the upcoming Fidesz congress scheduled for 9 July 1994 will also be able to express its opinion regarding this issue.

After several preliminary consultations, the Fidesz parliamentary group decided to divide the committee positions given to the Fidesz. Thus, the Fidesz parliamentary group will nominate Janos Ader and Jozsef Szajer to the Constitutional Committee, Laszlo Urban and Csaba Sumeghy to the Budget Committee, Zoltan Rockenbauer and Zsolt Nemeth to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Lajos Kosa and Laszlo Madi to the Economic Committee, and Tamas Deutsch and Gabriella Selmeczi to the Local Government Committee. Lajos Kosa and Laszlo Urban will be members of the Agricultural Committee, Szilard Sasvari will be a member of the Cultural Committee, and Gabriella Selmeczi will go to the Welfare Committee. Laszlo Madi will go to the Employment Committee, Tamas Tirts to the Human Rights Committee, Tamas Deutsch to the Environmental Protection Committee, Janos Ader to the Auditing Committee, Jozsef Szajer to the Immunity and Mandate Control Committee, and Laszlo Kover to the National Security Committee. Viktor Orban will be nominated as chairman of the European Affairs Committee, and Zoltan Pokorni will be nominated to the deputy chairman of the Educational Committee position. Tamas Wachsler will be chairman of the Defense Committee, and Bela Gyuricza will be member of the same committee. Szilard Sasvari and Zoltan Trombitas will be clerks of the committee.

Laszlo Kover told us that Karoly Eperjes did not make it in any committee because he is sticking to his earlier statement that he will hand in his parliamentary deputy mandate very shortly, at the best possible time for the parliamentary group. (He will probably be replaced by Mihaly Varga, whom the Fidesz group wants to use as a budget expert). Szekesfehervar Mayor Istvan Balsay cannot exercise his rights as parliamentary deputy because of the incompatibility rules, so he cannot be committee member either. At the same time, he will accept his mandate and will participate in the foundation session of the new parliament. If the situation changes and Balsay accepts the parliamentary deputy position, he will probably get into the Local Government Committee.

Both the parliamentary group deputy heads and the new heads will be elected at the end of this summer. Laszlo Kover and Jozsef Szajer will be nominated to the respective positions. However, Jozsef Szajer has not yet decided whether he will accept the nomination or not.

MSZP Chairman Comments on Coalition Talks

AU2206180994 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Jun 94 p 3

[Interview with Imre Szekeres, executive chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Pal Szombathy; place and date not given: "Today Is a Decisive Day for the Coalition"]

[Text] No one has won and no one has been defeated. With the guarantee agreement, we have drawn up a solution that allows us to make joint decisions, to govern jointly, and to share responsibility, Imre Szekeres said among other things.

[Szombathy] At the coalition talks on 20 June, agreements were reached that were characterized by both sides as progress. What are your views on these coalition agreements?

[Szekeres] In my view, the agreement on the governmental structure is a conditional agreement. Some questions on the governmental positions and structure have remained open, and it depends on these questions whether the agreement of 20 June will remain in force. We have achieved agreements on certain points but the final agreement can only be interpreted within the complete package. The open issues will be decided at the meeting on 22 June. We suggest that we agree on the members of the new government, their tasks, and what kind of ministries we will have, and we should also settle

the issue of national authorities, bodies, and offices. In my view, the governmental structure and the issue of positions is the less important, organizational side of the whole coalition agreement. The government program itself is much more important and it will be discussed today for the first time. I think it is a mistake that the government program has not been at the forefront of talks up to now. Society is more interested in the government's goals and ideas than in the bargaining mechanism of the partners. Therefore, the essence of the coalition talks will come on the agenda on 22 June, in other words, this is the decisive day in my view.

[Szombathy] The full government structure was revealed on 20 June. What else can be open issues?

[Szekeres] Although we have only left two or three points open, the whole agreement will only be valid when these are also settled. The fate and operation of the offices dealing with the country's internal security have not yet been clarified. We have not yet decided, either, what role the county-level governments should have in the regional governmental structure, which is another important issue of power sharing. These issues have a serious effect on the agreement on the Interior Ministry's operation.

[Szombathy] Observers appreciated the SZDSZ's success in the guarantee agreement and that the MSZP gained positions in the government structure. What is your view on this agreement?

[Szekeres] I do not agree with either statements because the observers were not able to look into the process of negotiations. No one has won and no one has been defeated. With the guarantee agreement, we formed a solution on the basis of which we will make joint decisions, govern jointly, and share responsibility. Other models would also have been possible, but we decided on this one. We have lifted the coalition coordination council out of the governmental structure because it does not legally fit into the government's work. Time will tell whether this model of operation is correct. No one has won in the allocation of governmental positions, either, because it is obvious that the various ministries have different effect on the country's life. The distribution of positions is not a purely quantitative, mathematical issue. The SZDSZ has acquired reasonable positions in areas that have significant influence on the country's life. However, the obligation of coordination also applies to the SZDSZ's ministries.

[Szombathy] Yesterday, both the SZDSZ and the MSZP were preparing for the talks on 22 June. What did the Socialist delegation agree on?

[Szekeres] We reviewed the materials of the special committees and tried to harmonize the differences. I met the MSZP's county chairmen and we drew up the schedule to follow the completion of the coalition agreement. On 24 June, we will look at the coalition agreement at the meeting of the national board of directors, and a proposal will be made on the parliamentary group's leadership. At the 25 June meeting of the national committee, the parliamentary group will also express its preliminary opinion on the agreement. We will choose the parliamentary group's leadership and delegate members to the parliamentary committees at this meeting. We will hold a ratifying congress on 26 June.

[Szombathy] Can debates be expected on the coalition agreement?

[Szekeres] I expect a clarifying congress, and we will definitely have debates. The only question that we can ask is whether the congress will accept or reject the agreement. In the MSZP and among our electors, many people have been expressing their reservations regarding the coalition agreement. The worries can be dispelled when they learn about the details of the talks.

[Szombathy] Your name has also been mentioned as parliamentary group leader for the MSZP. If you are elected, would you resign as executive chairman?

[Szekeres] No. If I am nominated to head the parliamentary group then I will occupy both positions until our congress in October. We wish to renew the party's entire leadership in October but, until then, we have to concentrate the parliamentary and party forces and tasks.

SZDSZ Chairman Comments

AU2206202094 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Jun 94 p 3

["Sz.Sz."-signed interview with Ivan Peto, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats; place and date not given: "The Coalition Agreement Is Not a Mathematical Operation"]

[Text] As a result of the planned coalition agreement, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] will have a serious influence on the whole work of the government, rather than only on the operation of certain ministries, Ivan Peto claims. Peto believes that, if the agreement is signed, the conventions of the two parties will, in all probability, approve it.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] On the basis of various newspaper reports, it was expected that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] would have eight and the SZDSZ four ministries in the new government. In view of the agreement reached on 20 June, do you think that the negotiating delegation managed to obtain adequate guarantees for the SZDSZ when the ministries were allocated?

[Peto] This agreement is not yet final, so the time has not yet come for drawing a balance. Many people believe that the coalition bargaining consists only of allocating ministries. However, in addition to this, we also have to agree on issues in connection with the government's order of business and on issues of guarantees. We also have to reach an agreement on issues of content because the policies of the coalition government will depend on these. Those who believe that the coalition agreement is purely a mathematical operation are wrong. I find it

unfortunate if the starting point for someone is whether we get three or four ministries. It has to be remembered, for example, that the various ministries have different levels of influence on society's life. The agreement whose framework is being outlined will, in my view, ensure a decent position for the SZDSZ, the smaller coalition partner within the government. As a result of the planned coalition agreement, the SZDSZ will have a serious influence on the whole work of government, rather than only on the operation of certain ministries.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] The party's convention on 26 June will have to approve the coalition agreement. Do you expect serious internal debates within the SZDSZ on accepting the agreement?

[Peto] As far as I know, we have also managed to assert a large proportion of our views in the special committees. On the basis of this, I can state that we did not only meet but actually exceeded the expectations of the convention that had empowered us to enter into the coalition talks. I am certain that we will have debates at the convention and at the 25 June meeting of the National Council, but if we sign the agreement, the deputies will most probably approve it. At the moment, there is a limited chance for debating this issue in the party because the contents of the final agreement cannot yet be known.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Together with MSZP Chairman Gyula Horn, you emphasized that the agreement on dividing up the ministries is not yet final. Do you think that serious changes are possible compared with what was published after the talks on 20 June?

[Peto] I do not see the coalition talks as closed because we still have to agree on issues of content. Serious debates can be expected in connection with this at today's session of the main delegations because many questions are waiting to be clarified. As for the ministries, some changes are still possible but this will not necessarily affect the proportions.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Is there a chance for agreeing on the supervision of the National Security Office?

[Peto] The views of the two parties have become closer on this point, too, and the outlines of a compromise solution are emerging.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] When and at what forum will you decide who should fill the SZDSZ's government posts?

[Peto] Naturally, we have for a long time had ideas about whom we would like to nominate for the various government posts. The executive body will make the final decision once the full agreement is known.

Walesa Pledges Confidence in Foreign Minister

LD2306180594 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1714 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Warsaw, 23 Jun—Poland's President Lech Walesa today sent a letter to Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, assuring him of "the unchanging confidence of the president of the Polish Republic in the minister and in the entire Polish foreign service."

Here is the text of the letter, passed to PAP by the presidential press office:

"Minister!

"Polish diplomacy yesterday became the object of a dramatic political debate. Many people who have served the Republic well and with devotion must today feel bitter and disoriented; can they continue to act in the name of the Republic? Can they credibly continue to represent it?

"I ask that at this difficult moment you assure these persons—all the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—of the unchanging confidence of the president of the Polish Republic in the minister and in the entire Polish foreign service.

"[Signed] Lech Walesa."

Olechowski, Romanian Counterpart Sign Agreements

LD2306125294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1102 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Excerpts] Warsaw, 23 Jun—On 23 June in Warsaw, Foreign Ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Teodor Melescanu signed agreements between Poland and Romania on avoiding double taxation on income and property; mutual promotion and protection of investments; and cooperation in science, education, culture, and sports.

Also signed was the protocol on cooperation between the foreign ministries of both countries. Minister Olechowski said that "he strongly feels that relations between Poland and Romania do not reflect the needs and positions of both states in Europe." According to him, agreements signed on Thursday form the basis and make the commitment to widen Polish-Romanian cooperation. [passage omitted]

According to Melescanu, Romania can use Poland's experience in integration with West Europe, and "mutual efforts in this direction are in Romania's interest." He stressed that Poland and Romania are the most important countries in Central Europe and could play an important stabilization role in this region.

Debate on Supervision of Army Continues

WS2306123494 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 23 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by pw: "Dispute About Supervision Over Army; What Goryszewski Will Write"]

[Text] *Henryk Goryszewski, chief of the National Security Bureau [BBN], which is associated with the Belweder, is writing a law on who will exercise supervision over the Army. "It is like telling a fox to guard a henhouse," say coalition Sejm deputies.*

Yesterday, the National Defense Committee [KOK], which includes the president, the prime minister, Sejm and Senate speakers, the chief of the General Staff, the BBN chief, and the four most important ministers, adopted a document prepared by the National Defense Ministry [MON] entitled "Fundamental Problems of Poland's Defense System."

It is an assessment of the country's security and a demonstration of future directions for reforming the defense system, said Henryk Goryszewski at a press conference. We recommended the document to the Council of Ministers. We deleted only one or two little pages....

But the problem is that these "little pages" relate to the most important issues, among them, who is to be the boss of the chief of the General Staff (Army commander): Is it the defense minister or the president?

KOK made a decision that Goryszewski will prepare a law dealing with all types of conflicts of powers and that he will present it in two weeks. According to unconfirmed sources, MON chief Piotr Kolodziejczyk was the author of the idea; he is clearly getting impatient with the ongoing debate on supervision of the Army. Prime Minister Pawlak supported Kolodziejczyk because he did not want to be at odds with the president.

The Council of Ministers Defense Issues Committee adopted a document entitled "Concerning Problems of the Country's Security" more than a month ago. In the document, the committee noted that an army's subordination to the defense minister is typical for European countries.

But Goryszewski is in favor of the Army's subordination to the president: One should counteract party influence over the Army. After all, the government in this country consists of parties and party coalitions.

In Goryszewski's view, MON has so far not come up with a draft law that would define the powers of the president and the minister. But, among the appendixes to the "Fundamental Problems..." there is such a draft law that contradicts the president's ideas.

Prolonging the dispute is very dangerous to the Polish Army, says former Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz of the Freedom Union. All of this should be

settled soon, while the chief of the General Staff should be subordinated to the minister, just like it is done in a majority of European countries.

Well, KOK wants that, so let Goryszewski write, write, write..., Jerzy Szmajdzinski (Democratic Left Alliance), chairman of the Sejm Defense Commission, told GAZETA WYBORCZA in an indolent tone.

Minister Views Privatization, Reprivatization

WS2306123094 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY (EXTRA supplement) in Polish 23 Jun 94 pp I, II

[Interview with Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek by Ina Boruszewska and Jerzy Krajewski; place and date not given: "A Calculation According to a Simulation"]

[Text] *"Returning property to its owners would cost 6 trillion zlotys [Z]," Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek tells ZYCIE WARSZAWY.*

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] When will Polish people receive certificates of participation in the popular privatization [swiadectwa udzialowe]?

[Kaczmarek] We are planning distribution of the certificates for the end of this year and the beginning of next year—that is to say, either in December or January. We do not yet know who will be handling the operation. Negotiations are in progress, among others with Poland's largest banks and the Postal Service. I think that over 2,000 distribution centers should be set up throughout the country, so as to have at least one in each gmina [small administrative unit].

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How much will each participation certificate cost?

[Kaczmarek] Every adult citizen is entitled to receive a popular participation certificate. The appropriate statute provides that only registration fees will be collected, which will be up to 10 percent of the average salary. The certificates will be in the form of bearer securities. One will be able to sell or buy them from someone else for any price that is set. If a certificate is lost, destroyed, or stolen, no duplicate will be issued. Through brokerage houses making appropriate account transactions, it will be possible to exchange certificates for one of the shares in investment funds.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko recently presented "Strategy for Poland," which is the government's new economic program for the next three years. Among other things, it envisions speedy commercialization of large state-owned enterprises. What will happen next to the enterprises that are transformed into Treasury-owned joint-stock companies?

[Kaczmarek] Through commercialization, we want to introduce management of state wealth through capital partnerships [spolka kapitalowa] in order to have a situation where supervisory boards [rady nadzorcze] and not employee boards [rady pracownicze] play a decisive role in firms subject to the transformations. Employee boards destabilize the situation of many companies.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But the "Strategy" program envisions the establishment of company boards [rady zakladowe].

[Kaczmarek] It is an attempt to look for areas of agreement in cases where there are, for instance, 15 different trade unions in an enterprise. I cannot imagine negotiating with each of them separately. Company boards—perhaps the name is not good—are to represent the entire work force of a company. Currently, we are helpless, faced with cases of obvious law violations. The recent strike in "Katowice" Steeelworks, for example, was a violation of the principles defined by a statute concerning the settling of collective disputes. An agreement was signed on salary policies one day, and, the following day, a small trade union was capable of turning everything upside down through its strike, not paying attention to whether the firm can afford the demanded pay raises.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But, in partnerships based on the Commercial Law, there are work force representatives sitting on supervisory boards.

[Kaczmarek] Employee representatives sit on a supervisory board, while company boards are addressed at trade unions. This reflects the "higher-level area of agreement"—that is to say, the Trilateral Commission (government, employers, trade unions). In a commercialized company and privately owned firms, we suggest the following scheme: owner, supervisory board, company board.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] When will commercialization begin?

[Kaczmarek] I would like it to begin on 1 January 1995 and to finish the following day, but, because of administrative or legal obstacles, that will not be possible, so we plan on finalizing commercialization of the 1,500 largest enterprises in the second half of 1995.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How long will the State Treasury continue to own these enterprises?

[Kaczmarek] We want to privatize them.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] By what method?

[Kaczmarek] Mainly by using the capital method and, to some extent, also through National Investment Funds.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] How long will the privatization done this way last?

[Kaczmarek] Ten to 20 years.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] That long?

[Kaczmarek] It may seem like a long time, but let us look objectively at how much we succeeded in privatizing using the capital method over three years. It was several hundred firms. That is the most in Europe or the world, anyway.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Speaking about other countries' experiences, do you not think we could use the Czech example and carry out privatization of large state-owned enterprises through the coupon method?

[Kaczmarek] I think the Polish and Czech popular privatization programs will converge at some point in the future. Then we shall see who gained a bigger advantage. The Czechs began by going "from the bottom up": First coupons were issued, then they were exchanged for shares in the funds. What we want to do is set up the funds first and then issue popular participation certificates.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The Polish popular privatization program covers just several hundred enterprises, while the Czech program covers almost all of them. One cannot compare the two.

[Kaczmarek] Given that we are muddling through conflicting interests right now, where every lobbying group wants to guard its own interest only instead of looking at macroeconomic policies, I cannot imagine coupon privatization being done in Poland. I am sorry, but I do not identify myself with the Czech philosophy of "capitalism coupons."

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But it may turn out that, in five years, the Czechs will have completely privatized their economy, and it will be much more efficient than the Polish one, which continues to be state-owned to a large extent. It is Czech firms and not Polish ones that attract more foreign capital.

[Kaczmarek] The Czechs recently announced that they have too much foreign capital. When it comes to Poland, you just cannot do everything contrary to public opinion. First, one must prove to the people that privately owned firms are more efficient than state-owned ones, and only then can one move on. One cannot draw such a conclusion from Polish privatization experiences.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Do you agree with the view that privately owned partnerships are more efficient than state-owned ones?

[Kaczmarek] Are you talking about the world or about Poland?

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Both.

[Kaczmarek] In other countries, the privately owned sector is indeed clearly more efficient than the state-owned one.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Does it follow that you regard Poland to be an abnormal country and that you want to consolidate inefficient structures here?

[Kaczmarek] No. I want to carry out privatization, but that requires time. We are certainly not planning on "preserving and stabilizing the old arrangement," as Henryka Bochniarz, who was the industry minister in the Bielecki Cabinet, says.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The Czechs have already demonstrated that one can privatize practically anything, even the refinery industry or regional railways. They have 900 enterprises registered on their stock market, whereas we have just 25.

[Kaczmarek] Yes, but what kind of a stock market is it really? Look at the enterprises, the share values, and the procedures applied. All of that is of very poor quality, so what you are saying does not convince me.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Why are the railways or the refinery industry not being privatized in Poland?

[Kaczmarek] Why do you ask me that?

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Because you are the ownership transformations minister...

[Kaczmarek] But I am not responsible for that. Address these questions to the transportation minister and the industry minister. Once I represent the owner of these firms, I will try to answer your questions.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What will happen next to the institution of the State Treasury?

[Kaczmarek] The Finance Ministry has prepared a draft that is based on a French/Italian model and that envisions the establishment of a management operating within the structures of state-owned enterprises through several different holding companies. The model, especially its Italian version, was a disaster. I am opposed to the idea because I do not want the emergence of another field for corruption. The Ministry of Ownership Transformations [MPW] proposes a merger of the structures of regional State Treasury offices, the MPW's regional branches, and departments of economic development and privatization in voivodship offices into single bodies called "agencies." Under the MPW's supervision, they will be managing the State Treasury's wealth at the regional level. We want to abandon central economic management. The proposal is included in the "Strategy for Poland" program. There is no question of a ministerial approach.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What will happen next to the reprivatization law?

[Kaczmarek] Its draft was transferred over for interministerial consultations.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] When will it be debated again by the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers?

[Kaczmarek] In a month or two.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] A few months ago, you said that a reprivatization referendum would be absurd. Right

now, you, along with Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, are in favor of voting on the issue of returning property to its rightful owners.

[Kaczmarek] I think that at times it is worth asking people whether they are willing to take the burden stemming from decisions that were made 50 years ago. We have adopted the principle that, as of 1945, a lawful legal order was in operation in Poland, and there are currently no reasons or conditions to apply the principle of restitution of property. So reprivatization will not mean a return of everything that was nationalized but only reimbursements for that property that was taken illegally. Former owners will receive reprivatization coupons in return.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But these coupons will be worth less than the property that was plundered.

[Kaczmarek] Why do you say that?

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Since you assume a degression scale will be applied on property worth over Z2 billion, everybody knows even now that the coupons' value will be lower than the value of the property.

[Kaczmarek] If we were not to adopt a degression scale, then, according to our estimates, the reprivatization would cost the state as much as Z200 trillion, and that would be only in the case of law violations that occurred between 1944 and 1958.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] That is not the reprivatization cost but an estimated value of the property that is being claimed by former owners. Tell us how much exactly taxpayers would have to pay in order for the state to return a plundered mill, a brickyard, or a manor house with a park to its owner?

[Kaczmarek] That is easy to calculate. It would be about Z6 trillion out of the state budget.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] According to what criteria?

[Kaczmarek] According to simple simulation...

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] What simulation are you talking about?

[Kaczmarek] What do you mean what simulation?! This is property that is in the hands of the state...

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But the state is not its owner.

[Kaczmarek] What do you mean the state is not its owner?! No, this conversation makes no sense at all...

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Mr. Minister, the state is just managing the property...

[Kaczmarek] And please explain to me why you are saying something like that.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Because the property was illegally taken away from its owners...

[Kaczmarek] No, it was not. It was nationalized in accordance with the appropriate laws.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But the state budget does not include the property.

[Kaczmarek] What do you mean?

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The state budget is a list of state revenues and expenditures.

[Kaczmarek] Exactly. Property can be sold, and revenue accruing from the sale can be listed in the budget.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Why cannot at least part of the plundered property be returned in its natural form?

[Kaczmarek] Because I do not want to have hundreds or thousands of conflicts. That is because I do not know why I am supposed to return a mill in Siedlce Voivodship in its natural form but not one in Ciechanow Voidodship because over there it would result in a major brawl. Everybody will be treated equally in the process; there will be no better or worse people. They will receive their coupons for which they will be able to purchase real estate. Nothing will be returned to them.

Mazowiecki on Economy, Relations With Europe

PM2406084494 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 13 Jun 94 p 5

[Interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Union of Freedom chairman and former prime minister, by correspondent Bohdan Onichimowski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Onichimowski] Your name is associated with the launch of the "Polish five minutes" in the history of contemporary Europe. Are these five minutes finished now?

[Mazowiecki] These five minutes have already lasted five years, and those five years could well have been 15 if we judge by the larger-than-life scale of the events that took place then. Whether our five minutes are still going on is a different question altogether. Certain fundamental issues have been resolved already. We are an independent and autonomous state, all decisions about us are made here and not somewhere else, and the direction of our economic future has been determined. You could say that we are now at a new moment in our history: The first stage is gone, and we must begin to build the second one.

[Onichimowski] But is the run of good luck for Poland in the international arena still with us?

[Mazowiecki] It is quite surprising, but Poland's economic achievements are noted with approval against the background of Central and East Europe as a whole. It is even said that we are the "economic tigers" in this part of the continent. So you can see that the judgment of outside observers is much more favorable than those from commentators at home. Of course, I understand

that such outside arguments are no good when it comes to convincing an unemployed person that our economy is good, but when you look at the problem in the light of all considerations, the opinions and the forecasts are good.

[Onichimowski] A few days ago, Jacek Kuron said that our road to Europe leads through the East—via Minsk, Kiev, and Moscow....

[Mazowiecki] I believe that this slogan conveyed the idea that good, open relations with these countries will result in an extended Europe, and, from Europe's viewpoint, the way in which Poland relates to these neighbors is most important.

[Onichimowski] But do you not believe that, at present, cooperation with these states has, as it were, slowed down a little?

[Mazowiecki] There is something in what you are saying. I believe that we must galvanize our foreign and economic policies. I can also say that I believe Minister Olechowski is trying to do just that. I agree with those who believe that any oversight on our part in these areas would be a serious mistake. However, there is also a wider phenomenon to be considered: The green grass of our new social and economic processes often grows faster than we think. I was once guest at a conference organized by the Robert Schuman Foundation, attended by delegates of a variety of associations and organizations of a pro-European persuasion, and I realized that there are very many such bodies in Poland. So I hope that there are also associations and organizations that are thinking of developing the eastward direction. And, if there are none, we must set them up and encourage them to be active.

[Onichimowski] We heard recently from a group of Bundestag deputies visiting Szczecin that our full participation in European structures would be conditional on making land available for sale without any restrictions. Would you accept such a condition if you were prime minister?

[Mazowiecki] All countries have certain regulations regulating the sale of land to foreigners. You must not preclude the possibility of such transactions, but the state can control their form and extent. Such control mechanisms are a normal thing and should be preserved.

[Onichimowski] As I point out that next year will see the 50th anniversary of the inclusion of Szczecin within our national territory, let me also remind you that you have special obligations toward the citizens of Szczecin. Should we remember our city's 50th anniversary, or should we forget it because it was politically incorrect forces that captured the city and politically incorrect decisions that decreed it would henceforth belong to Poland?

[Mazowiecki] No, no.... The anniversary is a most important occasion, and Szczecin, which is a very fine port city, has a significant role to play in both Poland and Europe.

[Onichimowski] This sounds a bit as if you were trying to canvas for Szczecinians' votes in the forthcoming election....

[Mazowiecki] I intend to do that, too. I believe that the vote of confidence I received here will be extended to accommodate voters' confidence in the Union of Freedom. I have already noted that the influence wielded by the Union of Freedom in this region is growing steadily, and our activists and sympathizers are dynamic individuals who want to achieve great things not so much for the party as such, but for the whole region—and who are capable of achieving it. Let me tell you—and this is not a superficial compliment—that the Szczecin region could easily become one of the best-developing areas of Poland.

[Onichimowski] Thank you for talking with us.

Lawmakers To Debate No-Confidence Motion

AU2306121194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] The censure motion against the Vacaroiu government, which was officially handed in last night to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate will be presented on Monday [27 June] during the joint session of the two chambers of parliament scheduled to begin at 1930.

The debates on the censure motion are to take place on Thursday, 30 June, also during the joint session of the Chamber of Deputies and the senate, report our correspondents.

Tension Escalates in Cluj Over Excavations

AU2206160694 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "The Dramatic Hours of Kolozsvar—Archeological Excavations To Start Today"]

[Text] There is a pogrom mood in Kolozsvar [Cluj]. Mayor Gheorghe Funar has announced that the archeological excavations around the statue of King Matthias in the center of town will begin today. He also promised to take legal steps against demonstrators, after the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] mobilized the population for a protest meeting at 1300.

We are aware of the fact that the planned archeological excavations in the center of town do not serve scientific purposes. It is a political provocation aimed at dismantling the statue of King Matthias, reads the appeal of the Kolozsvar county organization of the RMDSZ to the population of the town.

According to the RMDSZ, the planned action against the town's main square and the famous statue is the last straw in violation of the national dignity of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania. The RMDSZ called upon the entire population of Kolozsvar to participate in a protest rally organized on the main square at 1300 on 22 June in order to defend the statue and the St Michael Cathedral.

The mood in Kolozsvar has become extremely tense in the wake of the planned excavations, the removal of Josef Bem's memorial plaque, and the latest nationalist anticultural and anti-Hungarian provocations. In view of this fact, the operative council of the RMDSZ has been convened in Kolozsvar for this afternoon.

Given the fact that the municipal council failed to gather the necessary votes to allocate 30 million lei to finance the excavations, Gheorghe Funar proposed to postpone the debate. However, they announced that they would begin the excavations, even without the approval of the municipal council because the Historical Museum of Transsylvania allocated 10 million lei for this purpose.

Museum Director Gheorghe Lazarovici pointed out that the excavations are meant to "prove the continuity of the Romanian people" because the archeological excavations that began at the beginning of the last century were discontinued in 1943, and the scientific evaluation of the results took place in Budapest. If we cannot prove our thousands-of-years presence here with written documents, then we will dig in the main square of Kolozsvar for as long as 20 years to find the proof from the earth, Lazarovici said.

In the municipality meeting on 20 June, Funar pointed out that he would erase everything that refers to this town's Hungarian character and, at the next municipal council meeting, he would propose to change the name of the town to Napoca. Nicolae Ruja, an adviser of the Romanian National Unity Party, expressed the opinion that the statue in question should be located in the Hunedoara Castle rather than on the main square of Kolozsvar.

At a news conference on 21 June, Funar declared that the excavations would commence on 22 June. He said that it is impossible for this plan to generate any tension. If, however, those who are displeased decide to, nevertheless, demonstrate on the main square, he would use the legal stipulations regarding unannounced demonstrations and the offenders would be arrested. According to Funar, the Roman Catholic Church should not hinder the excavations because the National Council for the Protection of Monuments has already approved them.

In the Hungarian-language daily SZABADSAG published in Kolozsvar, Roman Catholic Dean Arpad Czirjak drew the attention of the Hungarians in Transsylvania to the fact that the Romanian nationalists are preparing for a final showdown against King Matthias' successors.

Both Hungarians and rationally thinking Romanians argued a lot for giving up the aforementioned plans in recent weeks. However, it seems that arguments no longer help. There is a pogrom mood in Kolozsvar.

Ethnic Hungarians Oppose Excavations

AU2206130394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Text] Currently, at the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] headquarters in Cluj, a news conference is taking place organized by the ethnic Hungarians' associations and organizations, as well as representatives of the Roman Catholic and Reformed Churches.

Among the audience there are distinguished authors members of the UDMR, among whom Sandor Fodor, the deputy chairman of the PEN Club of the Hungarian authors living in Romania, Kalman Csiha, the Cluj Roman Catholic bishop, Laszlo Tokes, the Oradea

Reformed Church bishop, and experts in various domains of history and culture, our correspondent, Florin Zaharia, reports.

The goal of today's news conference in Cluj is to present the stance of the UDMR opposing the beginning of the archaeological excavations in the center of that municipality.

Police Remove, Destroy Biligual Signs in Mures

AU2306172594 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Jun 94 p 3

["M.P."-signed report: "Name Sign Scandal in Transylvania, Too"]

[Text] On 21 June in Mures county, county police and road maintenance workers knocked down and smashed bilingual (Hungarian- Romanian) signs on the order of the prefect. Law enforcement units entered the private territories where the bilingual signs were located without the permission or agreement of the owners.

The police removed signs in more than 20 localities in Mures county. The statement of the county organization of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] published on 22 June condemns the anti-Hungarian provocation in Mures county. The statement specially emphasizes the Council of Europe documents and recommendations the Romanian government undertook to observe and whose edicts are ignored by the county prefect, the police, and the employees of other state offices.

PDSR Prepares for PD(FSN) Alliance

AU2406082094 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 21 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Ana Maria Vintan: "General Mobilization in the PDSR—Adrian Nastase Is Preparing for War"]

[Text] Adrian Nastase, executive president of the government party, is a person who, as a diplomat, is worth as much as an army of generals. One can observe his dexterity in keeping everyone satisfied and avoiding any scandal. However, for some time, the unchallenged president of the Chamber of Deputies has been going through difficult times.

He is being forced to change his tune. The first sign that should have warned him was his mini-conflict with Ion Iliescu at the Crans-Montana forum. The suspicions of some observers who, at the time, risked declaring that the "punch" Ion Iliescu gave his favorite was directed by other persons in the background have now been confirmed. Well-informed sources from the Cotroceni Palace admitted that, during that period, the president was poorly advised by his advisers. The most frequently repeated advice was: "It is too dangerous for you to propel Nastase forward so much." At that time, Nastase was supposed to mediate in the 'Arafat-Perez dialogue. Iliescu only sacrificed his pupil for something for which Ceausescu would have sacrificed his own right hand. What Iliescu did not know, but his advisers suspected, was that Adrian Nastase would react so violently. Once the ground was prepared, the rest was child's play. Convinced that the executive chairman had to be taught a lesson for his impertinence, Iliescu gave his advisers and their men in the party the green light.

Shortly after that, reports on Adrian Nastase's houses appeared in ADEVARUL. The file was urgently taken over by "jack of all trades" Ioan Gavra, secretary of the Investigation Committee. Initially disappointed by this attack which, according to persons in his entourage, he suspected would come, but did not believe would be "so mean," Adrian Nastase declared a general mobilization in the party. According to people in the know, the pacifist and mild chairman proves to be extremely rude. However, his enemies have a great advantage, namely they are one step ahead of him and they also enjoy Ion Iliescu's support. In addition, they have been preparing for this confrontation for a long time. All recent speculations about reformers and conservatives in the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] proved to be more than empty words, and the latest compromise actions of Adrian Nastase are the best proof for this. But, as we know, communists do not forgive, no matter how much proof of loyalty one gives them. Their greatest fear is that Ion Iliescu might change his mind. He recently gave some signs in this direction, and caused panic among his advisers, who urgently warned their party colleagues. Dan Martian [former president of the Chamber of Deputies], who wants to regain his position of president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Ioan Solcanu, who dreams to become the party chairman, have accelerated the pace and it seems that they have just arrived at the last 100 meters.

A very well informed person told us that the recent changes of direction in the PD(FSN) [Democratic Party (National Salvation Front)] are actually the aftershocks caused by the upheaval in the PDSR. Apart from a few loyal men in the party, Adrian Nastase seems to have no one else. He must form alliances. And whom could the former foreign minister think about first if not his former colleagues in the cabinet. The latest developments in the PD(FSN) are the extension of those in the PDSR. The following statement of the man who told us all this, naturally interested, is much too audacious to be ignored: "There is only one small step from here to an alliance between PD(FSN) and a possible faction of the PDSR." In any case, what seems to be certain is that we will have a series of surprises during the parliamentary vacation.

The first surprise will emerge at the PDSR National Council that will begin deliberations as early as next week.

Silajdzic Affirms Territorial Integrity Policy

AU2306201094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Report by Kenan Ekic and Zoran Babic report on speech by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo on 23 June—recorded]

[Text] At its session yesterday, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina decided to propose to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to elect Haris Silajdzic as head of the new joint government of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, the second day of the assembly session (?was characterized) by Dr. Silajdzic's speech on the basic principles of the new government's tasks.

[Begin Silajdzic recording] I would like to stress that the government should have a unified program concept, regardless of the fact that it has a double role. There are no strategic differences concerning the political aims of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that would require different program principles. The Federation is based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, therefore, the preservation of sovereignty [word indistinct] aim that determines the unified direction of the action of all republican and federal authorities. This is also a strategic aim of the program and [words indistinct], whose verification will be decided on by this assembly.

I believe that in this respect we have a consensus, not only of the Bosniak and Croatian people, but also of all the citizens who consider Bosnia-Herzegovina to be [words indistinct]. In addition to the unity on this vital aim, it is also very important to have a unified view on the means with which we intend to accomplish this aim.

I believe it is undisputable that we have decided to achieve this primarily in a peaceful way and with political means. Setting up the federation itself confirms that approach. We have invested much effort to find qualitatively new solutions that will secure full national equality, democratic relations, and the highest standards of human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This concept is determined by the Constitution of the Federation and it is already demonstrating its effectiveness on the ground with the majority Bosniak [words indistinct]. After the signing of the Washington agreements, the fighting in the region stopped within a very short period of time, and processes leading toward the establishment of a lasting peace have been started.

This is certainly a very important [word indistinct] in the direction of finding an overall peace solution to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we do not consider the federation to be a war coalition of two nations against the third, but a model of relations that offers all peoples and citizens an equal position within Bosnia-Herzegovina as an internationally recognized state.

This is confirmed by the positive reaction by those political forces that are also beginning to emerge increasingly within the ranks of the Bosnian Serbs as an expression of resistance to the fascist nationalism of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] and its leaders. Everyone can see what relations we are proposing and setting up at present.

The assembly that I am addressing as a Bosniak, a Muslim, as a (?nominal) prime minister is presided over by a Croat and a Serb alternately, depending on the constitutional form of the assembly' session. This is no coincidence. This is a real expression of a political project that we are promoting and offering.

We believe that the federation is a project that has a future, a project that will sooner or later be, not imposed, but accepted and established throughout the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we are very clearly expressing our commitment to finding political solutions in a peaceful way, political solutions that will justly satisfy the interests of all the nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a commitment that the government will firmly pursue at home and abroad. [end recording]

[Reporter] However, considering that the aggressor is still obstructing the peace initiatives, the international community must determine the sanctions for the aggressor and the guarantees for the implementation of the peace plans. The new government will consider [words indistinct] one of the priority tasks in its work.

[Begin Silajdzic recording] With the signing of the Washington and Vienna Agreements, the adoption of the Constitution and the corresponding Constitutional Law, the election of the president and vice president, the initial phase of the process of setting up the federation has been completed. Today's decisions on appointing a reshuffled government and laws on the federal state administration will fully establish the (?instruments) of the executive authorities at the federal level in a way that is constitutionally regulated for the transitional period.

The necessary prerequisites have therefore been created for an accelerated implementation of the constitutional provisions and the (?organization) of the authority at the cantonal and communal levels. In some regions activities have already been started to set up communal councils and cantonal assemblies. With its activities, the government should present a strong impetus for this process to be completed throughout the federation as soon as possible. There are no longer any valid constitutional-legal or political reasons to justify delays in the implementation of the Constitution at all levels [words indistinct]. The reasons why we should speed up the setting up of new bodies throughout the federation are not of a formal nature. This is the essential prerequisite for solving in an organized and systematic way the enormous problems caused by the war in all walks of life, problems ranging from the return of refugees to the

revitalization of the economy and the reestablishment of production and the financial system.

The constitutional position of the cantons in the federal system is such that they have numerous and very important duties that used to belong to the central authorities. These duties can and must be taken on only by the legal cantonal bodies, who will at the same time assume full responsibility for their work as determined by the Constitution. In that case, the government will indeed be able, in addition to its involvement in the peace process, foreign affairs, and defense, to involve itself maximally in work on the development of the economic system and economic policy, including the planning and rebuilding of the country, as well as regulating trade at home and with other countries, financial transactions at home and with other countries, (?setting up) the financial system, establishing control of the currency, creating monetary and fiscal policy, as well as defining energy policy. This means the inter-cantonal distribution of energy and the provision and maintenance of the necessary infrastructure.

It stands to reason that these issues will occupy the dominant place in the government's program, since these are areas in which the federation has exclusive jurisdiction, and which are by their very nature such that they mostly belong within the government's jurisdiction. The government will also—in accordance with the jurisdiction that will be determined within the federal authority—program and implement its tasks in the health service, social policy, communications infrastructure, the utilization of economic resources, and other areas in which the federation and the cantons have divided rights and responsibilities.

The government has to devote particular attention to the implementation of the constitutional regulations on human rights and basic [word indistinct], and—within this—the application of the right guaranteed by the Constitution for refugees to return to their homes is of particular importance. This is a problem whose solution cannot be delayed or conditioned by waiting for more favorable circumstances, at least not when it comes to territories under the control of the legal bodies of the republic, that is, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is a clear relationship here between the time that has passed and the number of people that will return. The longer it takes to return, the fewer will return. This is why it is the responsibility of all the bodies, including the Federal Government, to work in an organized way and, most important, quickly for the return of the refugees and displaced people. All those who do not behave accordingly can be considered accomplices in preserving the effects of ethnic cleansing. For this reason, and apart from other measures, it is very important that the federal courts envisaged by the Constitution be formed as soon as possible—in which a certain number of foreign judges will participate—and that the institution of the ombudsmen, the guarantors of human rights, be activated as soon as possible, which will initially function under a patronage of sorts of the CSCE.

The return of the refugees cannot depend solely on local cantonal authorities. This problem even exceeds the federal framework, since this is obviously a problem of international proportions. This means that the international community—in solving this problem—will be present both through the necessary financial help and through certain forms of institutionalized control. One such concrete step by the international community is the agreement by the European Union to administer the city of Mostar. We believe that this will help the [word indistinct] of this city, not only in material terms but also in overcoming the tensions created by the conflict, restoring confidence, and returning refugees. So the government should, within its jurisdiction, support this project by the European Union [words indistinct].

Within this time frame for the implementation of the [word indistinct], I would like to mention the foreign affairs [word indistinct]. Why? [words indistinct] the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, since the federation still has no international legal status, and the constitutional solutions envisage that the federation will not engage in foreign affairs until the peace process is completed.

As for the trends in foreign policy, I think that, in essence, the policy so far will be continued, with possible corrections as determined by developments, both external and internal. At the moment, however, there are no significant reasons for any radical changes in foreign or domestic policy.

New Government Includes Six Croatian Ministers

AU2306135594 Paris AFP in English 1337 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Sarajevo, June 23 (AFP)—The Bosnian Parliament Thursday unanimously re-elected Haris Silajdzic as prime minister of the new, deeply re-shuffled Bosnian Government which now includes six Croat ministers. Silajdzic will head a government acting not only as government of Bosnia but also of the Croat-Moslem federation in Bosnia which will officially come into being as soon as legislative elections scheduled for September are held.

There are 11 Moslem ministers including the prime minister and Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic, who kept his portfolio, as well as the ministers of the interior, transport, industry and energy, refugees and social affairs, education, environment and three with no portfolios. The six Croat ministers include Jadranko Prlic who was appointed defence minister and deputy prime minister. The Croats hold the finance, justice, health and trade portfolios and one minister has no fixed portfolio. Each minister's deputy will be from the opposing ethnic group.

Political analysts say that as the men in both governments are the same, with Bosnian Serbs occupying 70 percent of Bosnia and the ethnic divisions of the country having been radically modified in two years of warfare,

the day-to-day management of affairs is likely to remain unchanged. However, what is new is that the zones currently controlled by the Croat forces of Bosnia, that is the central area and practically the whole of Herzegovina, will be managed by Croats within the new government.

The existing structures are likely to change name, and the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, declared before the Federation, is likely to be diffused into the eight federal cantons: four Moslem majority, two Croat majority and two mixed.

The president of the Federation, moderate Croat Kresimir Zubak, and his vice-president, Moslem Ejup Ganic, were appointed in May.

Ambassador Views Prospects for Peace

AU2406105994 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jun 94 pp 38,39

[Interview with Muhamed Sacirbey, Bosnia-Herzegovina Ambassador to the UN, by Lidia Cerni; place and date not given: "I Do Not Believe in Just Peace"]

[Text] If I had to single out the person with whom I most enjoyed talking during my professional career while at the same time having the biggest technical problems, then this would definitely be Muhamed Sacirbey, the young (born in Sarajevo 1956) Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to the UN. Although, as he says himself, "he speaks Bosnian with more difficulty than he should have and his thoughts are always running ahead" he asked me to forgive him if he used any English words in the interview. His very successful two-year diplomatic career speaks of him personally and professionally more than any biography. Sacirbey graduated from law school in 1980 and a year later finished the Columbia Business School. Before his diplomatic assignment he worked as a very successful lawyer in a U.S. company specializing in international law. What probably predetermined Sacirbey for the diplomatic post in America were his manner, diplomatic skill, perfect English, and feeling for the right time and place.

[Cerni] The latest U.S. Congress resolution about the lifting of the arms embargo for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government has fully demonstrated the duplicity of the U.S. policy. The administration with the exception of verbal statements about the need to lift the unjust embargo has not done much so far while the Senate and the Congress have been faced for the second time with the decision whether or not to lift the embargo. How do you assess the latest resolution?

[Sacirbey] I believe that this is an important political and also symbolic decision. It is much more important than the actual implications on the battlefield. This resolution places a certain pressure on Europe and Russia, and also on Serbia, to reach a sort of peace settlement. I believe that some of the commentaries in Europe and even in the U.S. administration that the Congress resolution is not the right way are wrong. We in Bosnia care about peace and not war, as some think, wrongly anticipating our moves if the arms embargo were lifted. We would like to create a sort of equilibrium and make the peace talks proceed. Neither Europe nor America were willing to provide us with the necessary balance of power and the U.S. Congress has demonstrated a better understanding of the Bosnian problem than the U.S. administration. This is not merely a problem of "the victim of the Serbian aggression" which has a legitimate right to self-defense but a problem of principles and tactical conceptions, so to speak. This is the equilibrium of which I speak. We care a lot about peace, however, a peace that can last.

[Cerni] Russia, some European countries, and Canada are opposed to the unilateral U.S. lifting of arms embargo, and even President Clinton, although the decision is binding, can pass a veto. What will happen if he does so?

[Sacirbey] President Clinton must accept the consequences of this resolution because it is binding. I believe that he will also find it difficult to use his veto because this resolution is linked to a whole "package" of documents that give money for the U.S. defense and the Pentagon. I understand that numerous European countries, and even Canada, are not thrilled with the latest resolution because their soldiers are deployed in Bosnia. Many in the West, who have been "pushing" for "peace agreements" for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have with their stance in a way recognized the Serbian conquests in Bosnia and the results of a genocide, they have acknowledged that Serbia is the most powerful and the mightiest in the former Yugoslavia. The resolution could now shake up this concept and the victim of the Serbian aggression could finally get the opportunity to achieve the same position on the ground. This would be a direct threat to Serbian military predominance in this war.

[Cerni] If America lifts the arms embargo for Bosnia unilaterally then could this give impetus to consultations and talks in the UN Security Council about the passing of a similar decision?

[Sacirbey] This is a truly interesting question. I have talked to numerous people in America and the Security Council these days and the fact is that Americans do not have a determined plan, that is to say, strategy in this situation yet. I believe that they should put pressure on their friends and allies in the world to create a new strategy on Bosnia-Herzegovina that would penalize the Serbian aggression and the genocide more. This means that they would have to deploy bigger forces, for example through NATO or the systems of the UN Security Council, and truly lift the embargo. The worst thing that can happen is that the U.S. Congress would work in one direction and the U.S. administration in another. This would have direct consequences on the UN Security Council.

[Cerni] Many who are opposed to the lifting of the arms embargo claim that you are receiving arms from your Muslim friends in the world despite the embargo.

[Sacirbey] The lifting of the embargo would contribute to a peaceful solution for Bosnia and not to war. The peace process is a lengthy process and for the first time it gives the victim the right to self-defense. On the other hand, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government was always of the opinion that the embargo imposed on it was unlawful and not binding for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we have, thus, so far been forced to seek aid from anyone who wanted to help us. These are our friends and one cannot demand from any country in the world that has been the victim of aggression not to defend itself. This is stipulated in Article 51 of the UN. Naturally, we have accepted the aid that was offered to us for the defense of our country. Many would like to portray us as an Islamic country that has linked itself with the Islamic countries worldwide, which is not true. We are receiving aid and political support from various different countries. One should actually look where Serbia is getting its aid from. There are numerous gaps in the embargo against Serbia, it is smuggling oil, arms, and all other produce. On the other hand, the countries that speak most feverishly against the so-called Islamic danger in this region most frequently help the Fascist regime in Belgrade. However, this fact sheds a light on something else. Namely, a new alliance of the former communists and the neo-fascists is being forged in the former Communist Europe. This is connected to a desire to preserve the old "regimes," their infrastructure, and their armies. In the new system of free exchange of goods and democracy there is no need for Russia or Serbia to have such big armies and so many arms, especially if one bears in mind their "economic strength."

[Cerni] You have numerous friends among the Jews and the Americans and many ascribe the success of the latest Congress resolution to the powerful lobbying of the Muslim-Jewish-American circles. How big is this influence in fact?

[Sacirbey] The main man behind this Congress resolution is Senator Bob Dole. There is a Croat woman, a great friend of Bosnia-Herzegovina, working in his office. The truth is that we have some influence, however, in general the Muslims have not had too great an influence on the creation of U.S. policy. However, the Jews have a huge influence in America and we are very grateful to them for everything that they have done so that this resolution could see the light of day.

[Cerni] Let us return to Bosnia. What are your conclusions about the observation of the four-week cease-fire that has recently been agreed in Geneva?

[Sacirbey] Unfortunately, I cannot say anything about this because I do not have the information that is currently going on in the military sphere. However, it is important to emphasize that I personally was very satisfied with the talks with the contact group and [UN envoy] Mr. Akashi, and especially satisfied with the cooperation of the Croats and the Bosniaks in these talks. This has all led to a certain strengthening of our position in the peace talks. The talks about a political solution with the contact group are the most important as without them no concept of cease-fire is possible. There must be a powerful connection between our political talks here in Bosnia and the international factors, especially the contact group and Mr. Akashi.

[Cerni] Can you comment on the scope of present talks of the warring sides with the contact group. I am particularly interested in the maps of division and the issue of the Serbian corridor through the Bosnian Sava Basin.

[Sacirbey] I believe that it is too soon to discuss such issues because the contact group has not yet finished its job. I think that the issue of the so-called gray zones is very important. This is an opportunity to find a solution for the refugees and their permanent return to their homes. This is not merely a question of the Muslim refugees but also of the Croats who have escaped from the Serbian terror in Bosnia to Croatia. Unfortunately, it is forgotten that numerous Croats have been the victims of ethnic cleansing and genocide. We believe that these people should not seek permanent shelter in Croatia but should return to their homes. For this reason the concept of the gray zones can be applied in those regions where the Croats and the Muslims constituted the majority before the war, these are the towns such as Prijedor, Visegrad, Zvornik, and so forth.

[Cerni] What do you think about the scope of the Croatian-Bosniak Federation, that is to say, the results of the Washington agreement? How do you view the visit of [Croatian] President Tudjman in Sarajevo?

[Sacirbey] I am satisfied with the results so far and it seems that they are improving increasingly. The most important thing is that there is peace, that the people are not dying. However, we must go further. Some elements, especially in Herzegovina, are not exactly thrilled with this peace and we should, therefore, appease all the sides so that this peace may live. I am satisfied with the cooperation of Zagreb and Sarajevo so far, even though the cooperation in the Federation itself is proceeding somewhat slowly.

[Cerni] Finally, do you believe in a just peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina or can the term of a just peace be viewed only philosophically. Bearing in mind the situation on the field—the Serbs hold 70 percent of Bosnian territory and in the negotiations with the contact group 51 versus 49 percent to the advantage of the Federation are being offered—do you believe in a just peace after this war?

[Sacirbey] The concept of the so-called just peace can be accomplished only with difficulty in Bosnia-Herzegovina at this moment. However, we cannot agree to a concept that would offer less than a lasting peace, that is to say, what we call "a just and lasting peace and such a country." Just peace would be if the Chetnik forces were definitively defeated. For as long as the Serbs

are behind the negotiating table I find it difficult to speak about it. We must seek peace in which Bosnia-Herzegovina will be able to constitute itself as a country that will be fully functional and will be a country in the true sense of this word. We are aspiring toward a country that will reintegrate itself in the international processes like all other countries that have emerged from the inferno of Yugoslavia's disintegration. For this reason I am glad about the normalization of the relations in the Croat-Bosniak federation because the people are slowly returning to their homes. However, for as long as [republic of Srpska president] Karadzic and [republic of Srpska army commander] Mladic lead the Bosnian Serbs it will be difficult to achieve a just peace. They are the chief creators of this war and they must be held accountable for it. In its efforts, Europe is looking more for a realistic than a just peace in Bosnia. If we look for a realistic peace, then this must contain at least a certain degree of fairness and above all "a concept of the functioning of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina." We can never agree to the reality if Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a crippled country.

Contact Group Maps To Be Ready 28 Jun

LD2306174294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1539 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] London, June 23 (TANJUG)—The international "Contact Group" for Bosnia-Herzegovina is expected by Tuesday [28 June] to complete the maps for the division of the ex-Yugoslav republic into a Moslem-Croat and a Serb part, it was learned in diplomatic circles in London on Thursday. The same sources recall that Russia and the United States will have the final say on conditions for peace in Bosnia at the G-7 summit in Naples from July 8-10.

There are indications that Russia and the United States could present their own peace plan independently of the "Contact Group," although they, themselves, are represented in it. This creates further confusion in connection with the international community's anyway frail initiative for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. British political analysts on Thursday said they were surprised by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's statement that he did not rule out the possibility of the exemption of the Bosnian Moslems from the U.N. arms embargo.

The change in the Russian stand has increased fears that the arms embargo could be lifted, which would almost certainly lead to the continuation of the war, according to British assessments. It is recalled in London that the U.S. Senate is on Thursday to adjust its decision on the exemption of the Bosnian Moslems from the arms embargo with a similar decision taken by the House of Representatives.

The U.N. protocol and, indirectly, U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, himself, have made it impossible for U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina Gen. Michael Rose, who is best acquainted with the situation in the field, to explain to the U.S. senators how disastrous such a policy would prove to be. Under the U.N. protocol, only the head and the commander of the U.N. Protection Force for the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) can present their views on the matter.

Krajisnik on Contact Group's Proposals

LD2306175794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1626 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jun (TANJUG)—"Information that is available to us indicates that the work of the Contact Group is in its final stage," Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the republic of Srpska's people's assembly, told journalists today. "What we do know from reliable sources is that the Contact Group is in a dilemma about whether certain areas should be defined as gray zones or divided cities," said Krajisnik. "Neither is acceptable for the Serbian side, because our standpoint is that only clear-cut solutions can be a guarantee for lasting peace," Krajisnik said, recalling that during the contacts so far with members of the Contact Group, especially with the French and British, the Serbian side made this stand perfectly clear.

Commenting on Christopher's and Kozyrev's statements in Brussels, Krajisnik said that the aim of such statements was to exert pressure on all the sides in the conflict to accept the proposed solutions, while the main pressure was put on the Serbian side.

"The imposed solutions do not, however, lead toward peace and it is, therefore, justified to exchange arguments to see which sides are interested in which of the controversial areas in order to establish whose demand is more justified. Here I refer first of all, to areas in western and eastern Bosnia, and in Posavina," said Krajisnik. He recalled that the international community must bear in mind the fact that Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina already have a compact state territory, while efforts are being made to achieve the compactness of the Muslim-Croat federation by means of encroaching upon vital Serb interests to the detriment of Serbian territorial integrity.

"We accept that the Muslim side should explain why it insists on the enclaves that seriously effect the compactness of our territory, and if their arguments prove to be well-grounded and realistic we will acknowledge them," said Krajisnik.

Abdic Issues New 'War Threats' in Bihac Region

AU2306145994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Text] [Republic of Srpska president] Karadzic's chetniks have continued [word indistinct] of their forces on [word indistinct], then Grmusko [words indistinct] but fresh forces have also been spotted on other fronts.

[words indistinct] stepped up activities [words indistinct] commune. The chetniks attacked and [words indistinct].

Attacks by Abdic's traitor paramilitary army have also continued. Its members in this period [words indistinct] liberated the territories of Cazin and Velika Kladusa communes. They remain active around Doberovo, (?Trzac), Pecigrad, and [word indistinct]. This morning, attacks were stepped up in the (?Liskovac) region. Fikret Abdic's war headquarters has again issued war threats, (?stressing) that his army, together with their chetnik brothers, will use all the available means that have not been used so far. His [word indistinct] and every other fiasco is sufficiently illustrated by the fact that he has arrested and keeps detained about (?1,000) people. Since his 3d brigade has disappeared from the scene and his 1st brigade refuses to obey him, Abdic [words indistinct] these days in order to accomplish his [words indistinct] confirmed by the fact of constantly fresh [word indistinct] chetniks and preparations for new attacks in this UN protected zone, regardless of the fact that the truce is in force at present.

Muslims Shell Doboj; Civilians Wounded

LD2206115394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Text] Doboj, 22 Jun (TANJUG)—The citizens of Doboj have been in their shelters since early morning because Bosnian Muslims have been targeting the town with artillery shells from the direction of Tesanj. Five civilians, including two children, have been wounded.

Doboj Attack Renewed

LD2406100394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0908 GMT 24 Jun 94

[Text] Doboj, 24 Jun (TANJUG)—This morning Doboj [Serb-held city in northern central Bosnia] was again the target of Muslim artillery attacks from the direction of Gracanica and Tesanj [Muslim-held towns]. A number of destructive shells landed on residential and other buildings, causing considerable material damage. A general alert was sounded at 1030 and the citizens of Doboj went to their shelters.

Tudjman Gives Speech on Antifascist Day

LD2306090894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Speech by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Croatian Day of Antifascists in Pazin, Istria—live relay]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen; Croats; all citizens of Pazin, Istria and all other Croatian areas; you who came here of your own free will; and refugees who came because of their misfortune. Today we mark an official holiday in Croatia, to honor Croatian antifascism. This day has a special meaning for all of Croatia, and particularly for Istria. On this day, democratic and sovereign Croatia shows that the antifascist struggle is one of its foundations. In this antifascist struggle, in the difficult and crucial days of World War II, Croatian patriots helped preserve the Croatian nation and create a democratic, independent, and sovereign Croatian state.

This day was forgotten in former socialist Yugoslavia and in socialist Croatia when it was part of Yugoslavia—in other words, it was falsified. Instead of marking 22 June, when in 1941 Croatian antifascists began their struggle against fascism, it was a struggle for a Croatian state and not for a Yugoslav state. Instead, authorities of socialist Croatia proclaimed 27 July as the day of antifascist uprising, the day when Serbs from Bosnia and Knin began fighting against the Independent State of Croatia [NDH, Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska]. The Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia fought not because the NDH was linked with fascist Italy and Germany but because it wanted to be Croatian. Serbs and Chetniks from Knin were those who established links with fascist Italy, and they would do the same today if they could.

Therefore, the current democratic and sovereign Croatia was the one which set the matter straight as it will do with everything else in Istria and the Croatian nation. [applause]

I happened to know, or shall I say, I was honored to know, personally the man who on 22 June 1941 led 40 Croatian communists from Sisak to the forest of Brezovica, thus starting the antifascist struggle in Croatia. This struggle was against fascism but also, as I said, for a free Croatia. It was Vlado Janic, nicknamed Capo, a Croatian man, a Croatian worker, a communist, but nonetheless a man who knew by heart the main ideas of Antun Starcevic [19th century Croatian intellectual] and the Radic brothers, Antun and Stjepan Radic [prewar political leaders championing Croatian independence], a man who [interupted by applause] fought that antifascist war in Croatia with this idea of an all-Croat struggle. In Belgrade he was the one who ordered the arrest of Punisa Racic, the man who murdered the Croatian leader Stjepan Radic in the parliament in Belgrade, and brought him to justice.

This is what is essential in Croatian antifascism, and this is what we are accordingly going to pay deserved tribute to, as an integral part of the Croatian people's struggle for freedom. [applause] Viewed as a whole, this antifascist struggle by Croatia was one of the greatest, not only within the confines of the countries of the former Yugoslavia but in Europe, as well. There is no truth in all those stories, which were meant to fool both the Croatian and the international public, according to which this partisan, national liberation struggle in Croatia was a Serbian struggle alone. In the partisan antifascist movement—in Croatia's partisan army—Croatians accounted for over 60 percent. There were 28 percent of Serbs and all the other nationalities, including Italians, Hungarians, and even Germans and Ruthenians.

Hence, the armed force of Croatia's antifascist struggle was Croatian. Understandably, a higher proportion of Serbs than Croats took part in it because the Croats had been truly divided in that period when battles of global proportions were being waged between the antifascist coalition and the axis forces. The leadership of the antifascist struggle in Croatia was in Croatian hands. At the helm of this antifascist struggle in Croatia was Andrija Hebrang, a Croatian communist but also a Croatian patriot. There was also the Croatian poet Vladimir Nazor, who worked here in Istria. It is here where he wrote his beautiful poetry in the Istrian dialect.

After all, there is nothing accidental in the life of a people or a movement. If we say that Croatian patriots, such as those I have just mentioned, were at the forefront of Croatia's antifascist struggle, then we should also mention that it was also Croats who led the antifascist struggle across all of Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito was a communist, but he was a Croat, too. Ivan Ribar [Croatian communist killed during World War II], was at the helm of the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia]. He was a Croat, too. [applause]

In that leadership of the antifascist struggle of both Croatia and Yugoslavia, prominent positions were also held by the representatives of Istria, representatives who favored the Croatian character of Istria and who fought for the survival of the Croatian identity in Istria and for having Istria as an integral part of Croatia. [applause]

It seems that even you in Istria have forgotten that Ante Mandic was also one of the most distinguished and well-known people of this kind. During the First World War, he was the man who advocated the unification of all Croatian lands and their liberation from Italian occupation. He was on the Yugoslav Council during the First World War. In the Second World War he joined the antifascist struggle here in Opatija. Later he became a ZAVNOH [National Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia] deputy and a deputy of the AVNOJ. As a well-known democrat he was even a royal deputy at the time the Karadjordjevic dynasty was ousted and federal Yugoslavia was established.

Hence, Istria has contributed its share to the leadership of the antifascist struggle. This antifascist struggle was of particular importance to Istria because the antifascist

struggle [pauses].... not only in Istria, for if there had been only that which could have survived as antifascist in Istria then Istria would not have survived as being Croatian as it would have been subjected to the Italian fascists and the German Nazis. [sentence as heard] Istria could have survived at that time, and it can survive today, but only as an integral part of Croatia. Those who [interrupted by applause, pauses].... And this is one of the reasons why [applause] the state holiday devoted to the antifascist struggle is celebrated here in Istria. We are also celebrating this date because the antifascist struggle waged by the Croatian people as a whole enabled Istria to become reunited with mother Croatia—not only Istria, but Rijeka, Zadar, and the Adriatic islands as well. This antifascist struggle enabled Croatia to become a constituent part of the global democratic coalition and, on the basis of this, to gain the right to build its independence and sovereignty, to become a recognized member of the international community.

The celebration of antifascism in Istria should also be marked so as to recall that all that Istria went through before was the worst tragedy for Croatian national consciousness and the Croatian nation. Many have forgotten this. They are even promising Istria some kind of better days. If this is so, let us recall what has been happening to Istria in the recent past, since World War I, from the London Treaty to the Rapallo Treaty, since the time the European imperialists wanted to settle their accounts and imperialist divisions by using Croatia and Croatian lands.

Following World War I, at the time of the disintegration of the Hapsburg monarchy, genuine Croatian patriots were advocating Croatia's unification with Serbia and other south Slav lands, not so much because of illusions but because of practical political interests and needs, in order to prevent the implementation of the London Treaty by which the European powers promised not only Istria but also Dalmatia to Italy, and, if unification did not materialize, Slavonia and Bosnia to Serbia. Therefore, Croatian patriots—those from Istria as well, people like Ante Mandic—were thinking of ways to prevent the disaster from occurring. This was accomplished through the creation of the new state. Dalmatia did not become part of Italy, Slavonia and Bosnia were not taken away from Croatia, but Istria remained under Italian occupation. And what happened? Members of other nations comprising the Hapsburg monarchy were immediately released from internment camps, but not Istrian Croats and Slovenes. They remained imprisoned. What ensued was a lurid time for the Croatian people in Istria. The Italian occupation authorities began persecuting everybody, from the common folk to the most influential people, from the peasants and laborers, teachers and priests to everything that had meant something among the people. [sentence as heard]

Under the pretext that they were looking for weapons, the Italian carabinieri were searching Croatian homes, stealing all valuable objects, and setting Croatian homes on fire. For instance, in Krnica in 1921 fascists killed two peasants and locked up 89, set 26 houses on fire, and looted the area. This unbearable situation led to the well-known uprising of miners in Labin in 1921, and on 28 February 1921 the Labin republic was proclaimed. The reasons for this were not just social and [word indistinct] but also national.

The main witchhunt continued against all those who kept the Croatian spirit alive in Istria, above all against teachers and priests. It is estimated that in the first days of Italian rule about 2,000 public workers were interned in Sardinia and Lipari near Trieste. Many were expelled from Istria, and their places were taken by Italians, including village sisters, teachers, and others. A (?Krk) bishop (?Mandic) was imprisoned, and Andrija Karlin from Trieste was expelled. In Italy in 1919 35 Croatian priests were interned, and 23 priests were imprisoned. One hundred and eight priests and 180 lay priests were expelled across the border, and 15 [word indistinct] convents were closed down.

Most serious crimes were committed during the elections of 1921. Even when it was not an entirely fascist state Croatia took advantage of the fascist movement, giving it financial and moral support. This movement and its paramilitary formations, the Black Shirts, used all methods of terror: beating, intimidation, and preventing the expression of Croatian national consciousness. Decrees of 1923 to 1927 changed Croatian names and surnames, as well as names of places, to Italian ones. One decree even banned what they called ridiculous non-Italian names.

Gentlemen, try to recall these times and how important it was, despite all of this, to preserve the Croatian consciousness, but only through links with the Croatian state and not through a desire to separate Istria from Croatia. [applause]

In these years the majority of Croatian and Slovene schools in the Slovene part were banned. The Italian language was introduced as a mandatory subject in (?382) schools. Italian teachers were brought in and the Croatian ones expelled. In the Croatian part of the Koper district alone seven Croatian schools either came under Italian administration or were shut down. The same fate was shared by 19 schools in the Pazin district, 34 in the Pula district and all but two in Porec district. All Croatian papers, newspapers, and books were banned. Of all the writings in Croatian only the book of prayers remained: Our Father, Thy will be done. This will is sometimes under duress but it will be done by the being that is the essence of all Croats. [sentence as heard]

The abolition of all Croatian educational, economic, [word indistinct], and sports associations, the abolition of all organizations, led to the Italianization and de-Croatization of Istria. Fascist terror in Istria assumed such proportions as rarely seen in Europe.

By resorting to open terror, they stage-managed various show trials: The most notorious one in Istria was the one of patriot Vladimir Gortan and his comrades from

Berm. It would be impossible to recount all the hardships Istria had gone through during the Italian fascist occupation. In one year alone—1934-35—our people were sentenced to 431 years in the dungeon. While the Croats were persecuted and jailed in this way, the Italians and the pro-Italian independence seekers were buying up Croatian land and doing what some are using today to claim that Istria is Italian.

This persecution and impoverishment of the Croatian people in Istria resulted in the expulsion of some 100,000 Croats from Istria. Of this number, some 70,000 Croats moved to Croatia and other southern Slav countries while around 25,000 emigrated to North America and around 5,000 left for Belgium and France. This exodus of the Croatian people from Istria was joined by another 40,000 Croats from the regions occupied by the Italian occupation army following the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1941.

All of this persecution, this terror, this policy of Istria's de-Croatization did not achieve the desired results. But the consequences of this will even be exploited today as an impetus for continuing such policies. No wonder the demographic picture of Istria was altered with the persecution of Croats and the colonization of Italians—not only officials and Carabinieri, but also workers, [word indistinct], road builders, lumberjacks, teachers, and others. The demographic picture was not the only thing that had changed. This left a deep psychological and political imprint. To hell with that, gentlemen, brothers, and sisters, we shall heal these wounds and we shall not allow Istria to be ruled by the consequences of such a situation. [applause]

This is how Istria entered World War II, when the antifascist struggle began in Croatia. The antifascist leadership of Croatia, headed by Andrija Hebrang, immediately comprehended its historic task: that it should kindle and organize the antifascist struggle in Istria. From the very first day of the antifascist struggle in Croatia it considered Istria to be an inalienable part of the antifascist struggle and a constituent part of Croatia. It directed the antifascist struggle on such a basis, and I personally know Istrians who were in Zagreb at the time and whom the leadership of Croatia's antifascist struggle was sending to Istria and Gorski Kotar to organize the antifascist struggle in Istria from Gorski Kotar. [applause]

Of course, the Italian fascist occupiers were particularly bent on weeding out any possible form of antifascist resistance in Istria, and that is why the beginning of the armed struggle here, the organizing of Partisan units and bodies of antifascist authority was extremely difficult; so the antifascist struggle in Istria had to be directed from Gorski Kotar.

The National Liberation Movement in Istria grew somewhat in size in 1942 when, led by the Communist Party of Croatia, a directive was issued, and district committees for Istria and other antifascist bodies of the antifascist struggle in Istria were formed.

The fifth battalion of the Primorsko-Goranski Partisan Detachment was formed in Gorski Kotar in May 1942 with the task of going to Istria and setting in motion the antifascist struggle there. But the power of the Italian fascist occupier ... [pauses] and the oppression of the Croatian people in Istria was such that it was unable to provide support and so this battalion was unable to break through there. However, attempts to break up the antifascist struggle were resumed. In the second half of 1943 a group of fighters moved from the area of Ilirska Bistrica and pitched camp on (Planik) but was unable to maintain itself there either. It had to return to Gorski Kotar. With the repeated attempt of the Istrian Croats who were there, and as a result of the efforts of the Croatian antifascist leadership, an Istrian Partisan unit was re-formed in the area of Gerovo and sent back to Istria. The Istrian detachment known as Vladimir Gortan was founded in August 1942 from the Istrians who fought in Gorski Kotar and in other Croatian areas—and they were in all Croatian regions, something which indicates the unity of Croatian Istria.

In September, following the capitulation of Italy, a general uprising of the Croatian people broke out. It was led by antifascist organizations. Italian military formations were disarmed, and virtually the whole population of Croatian Istria took part in this general Croatian uprising. About 9,000 Italian soldiers were disarmed. About 18,000 people took part in this antifascist movement at that time. By 11 September 1943 virtually the whole of Istria was liberated, apart from Pula, Koper, and Izola.

The National Liberation Committee for Istria proclaimed the unification of Istria and Croatia on 13 September 1943. The proclamation says: The spirit of Istria has remained unsubjugated. We did not want to become obedient slaves. In these decisive moments our people have demonstrated a high level of national consciousness. They have proved to all and sundry that Istria is a Croatian land and that it will remain Croatian [applause].

Let those who do not like to hear these words here today ponder this historical document.

This historic document further says: Relying on their own resources and not waiting for others to bring them freedom, the Istrians rose and stormed the barracks, seizing arms which are to be used in defense of their right to liberty; they opened wide the notorious prison gates and released the proud sons of unsubjugated Istria; never again shall we allow others to manipulate our fate; the Italian garrisons are in our hands; Italian soldiers are fleeing our soil; the people are taking the helm into their own hands for the first time in history; Istria is joining the motherland and is declaring unification with the rest of our Croatian brothers [applause].

We are firmly holding these arms, the proclamation told Istrians. Let us stand at the bulwark of liberty and let us not allow anybody to take it away ever again; we must remain masters in our own home; the proclamation ends by saying "Long Live Croatian Istria" and by hailing the members of the antifascist democratic coalition, Yugoslavia among them.

This decision by the Istrian (?National Liberation) Council on unification with Croatia was confirmed by ZAVNOH, the National Antifascist Council for the People's Liberation of Croatia, on 20 September 1943, which on this occasion anulled all treaties, pacts, and conventions concluded by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and later the NDH [Independent State of Croatia] in relation to Istria.

In mid-September 1943, the main HQS of the Croatian Partisan army sent a large number of military commanders to Istria to organize new units. The operative HQS for Istria was formed here in Pazin on 23 September. The First Istrian Brigade, Vladimir Gortan, was also formed in September, as well as the Second Istrian Brigade, the First Partisan Ucka Unit and the Second Pula Unit. At the same time a brigade and unit were formed in the Slovene part.

However, what ensued was the occupation of Istria by the German Nazi army. This occupation was just as oppressive, so oppressive that it managed to push back the partisan forces; moreover, it again gave free reign to those who had ruled during the Italian fascist occupation, the pro-Italian independence seekers, and all those anti-Croatian elements. Italian secessionists in Istria were emboldened by this occupation.

Of course, the Croatian leadership did not give up the idea to continue the antifascist struggle in Istria, to nurture the Croatian spirit in Istria, and to create conditions for Istria's unification with Croatia after the war. In such circumstances and regardless of the difficulties encountered in the military sense, representative bodies of the antifascist movement were being formed in Istria. In addition to the Provincial National Liberation Council—which was later renamed the Regional Council—there were three district councils: in Pazin, Buzet, and Pula; there were 13 district councils, 37 municipal councils, 3 city councils and 330 local village councils with more than 1,800 deputies.

The number of fighters increased again—from 1,300 in February 1944 to more than 4,000 in April. At that time the leadership of the Croatian antifascist movement decided to form new Istrian brigades. The Vladimir Gortan Istrian Brigade was formed on Mount Ucka on 1 April. A conference of the Croatian antifascist youth of Istria was held the same day, and was attended by some 800 delegates.

The Pino Budicin Battalion was formed of fighters of Italian nationality on 4 April near Bale.

The Ucka partisan unit was formed on 6 April and the second Pula unit was formed on 11 April. However, all these would not have been sufficient to liberate Istria, and the Croatian leadership passed a decision to form the 43d Istrian Division in Gorski Kotar. This division included the 1st, the 2nd, and the 3d Istrian Brigades, while the Buzet-Porec unit was formed as an auxiliary unit in Istria.

All in all, upheld by the spirit of Croatian Istrians and by the special concern of the Croatian antifascist leadership, the antifascist struggle in Istria was continuous. About 30,000 soldiers took part in the antifascist struggle. Five to six thousand fighters fell in this struggle—the figure is not precise, it is high time that the precise figure is established. There were about 25,000 members in the youth antifascist organization. I have already spoken about the national power committees. There was also a women's antifascist organization.

Those Istrians who were forcibly mobilized into the Italian Army joined the overseas brigades after the capitulation of Italy. These brigades later became part of the partisan units. The Italian and German occupying forces in Istria killed—according to the information at my disposal—4,285 of its citizens; 21,509 persons were taken to concentration camps; 5,595 houses were burned down or destroyed.

In this antifascist struggle Istria gave a large contribution toward the toppling of fascism, its liberation, the annexation with Croatia and toward the victory of antifascism in Croatia. Istria has 10 people's heroes: Olga Ban, Dragomir Bencic, Mateo Benussi, Mate Blazina, Tino Budicin, Jurica Kalac, Joakim Rakovac, Jovan Stokovac, Joza Suran and Agustin [last name indistinct]. Istria has a lot to be proud of—with its contribution in the antifascist struggle. This contribution and the lives which Istria had given put us under the obligation to honor the proclamation of Istria: that Istria has been and will always be a Croatian land. [applause]

Despite the fact that during the fascist occupation and the antifascist war a large part of the Italian minority stayed close to the Italian occupying authorities—which resulted in strong hatred between the local Croatian population and the Italian minority—nevertheless, a process was under way even at that time to create an alliance between Croatian patriots and Italian democrats and antifascists. This helped to provide the possibility for setting up Italian units and for laying the foundations of cooperation between the majority Croatian people and the Italian minority in the region at a later stage and today.

However, the victorious end to the antifascist war in Croatia and former Yugoslavia, as I said, under the leadership of the Croats Andrija Hebrang and Vladimir Nazor in Croatia and Josip Broz and Ribar in Yugoslavia—and this was not a coincidence—this victorious end which resulted in the genuine integration of Istria in the mother country, this victorious outcome, meant that the

dreams of the Croatian patriots within the Renaissance Movement and generally of the Croatian people in the region had come true. But, during the socialist Yugoslavia and socialist Croatia they were let down even, as I said, when it came to the anniversary day and in everyday politics, in particular.

Today Istria must remember that Croat statehood in Istria, that the antifascist struggle in Istria, could not have been possible without those Istrian champions of the Croatian Renaissance Movement who had close links with the Croatian nation's 19th Century Renaissance Movement, in general.

Juraj Dobrila, Dr Dinko Vitezic, Matko Bastijan, Matko Mandic, Dr. Anton Mahnic, and Dr. Matko Laginja, a lawyer and writer who at the time of the creation of the common state was in charge of the initiative to incorporate Istria in the mother country, were all Croatian champions of the Renaissance Movement in Istria. Of course, a special place among these is reserved for Vjekoslav Stincic, and Bozo Milanovic, a priest who took up and further promoted the traditions of the Croatian Renaissance Movement and who, in the socialist period after World War II and at the Paris Conference, had the courage to say that Istria was Croatian and could be neither Slovene nor anyone else's. This was recorded in international diplomatic (?documents) [applause]

I have already mentioned Dr. Anton Mandic—not just because he played a prominent role as a Croatian politician from Istria between the two world wars, but also because after World War II he was the one who was aware of something that tends to be ignored today, the man who was aware that Croatia [as heard] would have to be extensively linked with its mother country of Croatia, who tried to persuade Josip Broz as far back as 1945 and 1946 to have a road and rail tunnel built under Mount Ucka to link Istria with Croatia. He also suggested other measures—and I personally spoke to him about them. People of this type are often forgotten nowadays and instead, ideas are promoted which advocate that Istria be singled out as something special.

In the socialist period Istria was neglected because the Croatian communists who came to power in Zagreb after Hebrang did not know how to pursue a correct national policy. Theirs was an internationalist policy. I personally heard them say that in socialism it did not matter whether Istria was Croatian, Slovene, or Italian. These people were playing games with the fate of both Istria and Croatia. But those times have long gone. The centuries-long struggle of the Croatian people in general and of Istria in particular ended with the creation of the independent and democratic Croatia which will know how to compensate for the evil deeds and injustices committed against Istria. These are, above all, reflected in the fact that foreign occupation, or more specifically the Italian occupation, and the anti-nationalist and anti-Croatian policy by socialist authorities, resulted in the gradual reduction of—and not just by Italian but also earlier by the policy of the Habsburgs—resulted in the gradual reduction in the size of the Croatian population in Istria.

Any normal person must take heed of the fact that in 1846 there were 134,455 Croats living in Istria, that in 1919 there were 181,605 Croats in Istria, and that in 1981 that number was 134,890—or as many as 140 years ago but fewer than 70 years ago—and that between 1981 and 1991 the number of Croats in Istria dropped to 111,593. These are the consequences of Istria's special position and of a policy designed to alienate Istria and to undermine its Croatian identity. [applause]

Present-day democratic Croatia can and must rectify the situation. [applause]

The state and political leadership of present-day Croatia, who, despite the unfavorable domestic and international situation, knew how to go about creating a democratic, independent, sovereign, autonomous Croatia, to ensure not merely its international recognition but to see it accepted within the world international system as a serious factor in creating a new international order in this part of southeastern Europe—this leadership will know how to resolve all problems facing the Croatian people and the Croatian state in Istria. This Croatian leadership will know how to ensure Croatia's economic, cultural and democratic development.

But we shall not allow ideas which—whether those who promote them in the name of Istria's alleged special position like it or not—we see as direct continuation of the situation which led to Istria losing some of its Croatian characteristics.

So let me repeat: Just as Croatian national consciousness was maintained in Istria by virtue of the fact that Croatian revivalists from Istria were linked with Croatian revivalists in the 19th Century, so the antifascist struggle in Istria could develop and bring both the victory of antifascism to this movement in Istria and the decision, adopted in 1943, to join and unite with the homeland of Croatia. This was because Istria's antifascist struggle was linked—and not merely linked but had its foundations and drew its strength from and had its base in the entire antifascist struggle in Croatia.

Hence the reality of Istria today—including political, economic and any other reality—can advance and develop only if linked, or if you like only if linked even more closely, with Croatia than all the other counties of Croatia, precisely because Istria has suffered such consequences and because claims are being made [applause]. And ladies and gentlemen, dear Croatian brothers and sisters, and all citizens of Istria, as a result of all those theories and political programs which talk of Istria as a separate entity and of Istria as a transborder region and of the demilitarization of Istria, of the separate Istrian people, of the self-sufficiency of Istria and even the exploitation of Istria by the rest of Croatia are not only harmful but possibly dangerous and fateful.

Those behind these ideas—whether they are aware of this or not—these are all a continuation of those policies and that situation which brought about such circumstances that made us feel the consequences in Istria of foreign government and of the foreign political occupation about which I have spoken.

These theories and these political programs—regardless of how many democratic trappings they may have—play into the hands of those who, both publicly and in secret, stress rights, not only in Istria but also in Rijeka and Dalmatia. And it should not be forgotten that in earlier times Italian irredentists and imperialists knew how to exploit the supporters of Italian rule in Istria and Rijeka and the idea of denationalization. They would even cede Rijeka to Italy, which otherwise, according to peace treaties, was not envisaged for unification with Italy. So they knew how to use these phenomena on our territory and they would know how to exploit these regionalist ideas today just as formerly the pro-Italian independence seekers did, [applause].

Naturally, the Croatian people, which have demonstrated their national and democratic maturity, which have established their own independent and democratic state, their sovereign state, will not allow these ideas to develop into a real threat. [applause].

And as I have said, this democratic Croatia itself will know how to bring Istria into Europe. Furthermore, Croatia was a constituent part of Europe throughout its history and was at the top in terms of all civic activities, as a constituent part of central Europe. What has happened in the last 20 or so years when it was Balkanized has not changed anything in essence, while today, as I have said, Croatia is a recognized factor in the world with which all relevant and important European and world factors reckon.

Today, democratic Croatia not only has friends and allies but it has an international position which enables it to defend its sovereign rights and enables it to liberate still occupied territories with the aid of the international community if possible. If this is impossible then all means will be used with the understanding of the international community because the international community is aware that democratic Croatia is conducting a just, peaceful policy and that it wants to be a factor of peace and cooperation between the nations in this part of Europe. [applause]

We must not allow any regional ideas which would be a continuation of pro-autonomy and pro-Italian movements in a negative sense in this territory but we also must not forget that Italian fascist occupiers—even though they were ostensibly allies of Pavelic's NDH—established links with chetniks from Knin during World War II and that they are doing the same today, that they are being visited by certain Italian senators in Knin and at their gatherings. They are even making some ridiculous jokes about establishing some kind of relations.

Therefore, even today we have these trends in our territory and despite political and other changes they are present all the time—an attempt to cooperate between Italian fascist imperialism and irredentism and greater Serbian imperialism—this has to be borne in mind here in Istria all the time. [applause]

This association of Italian fascists and irredentists and the Knin rebels against Croatia looks funny and it is funny, but it could be tragic if we were to forget that even the smallest of dangers can become a huge threat if it is not taken into account. Democratic Croatia wants to cooperate with democratic Italy and to secure all ethnic minority rights for the Italian minority in Istria and Rijeka, in accordance with international conventions. However, we demand the same for the Croatian minority in Italy, from Trieste to [word indistinct]. The Croatian minority in Italy is larger than the Italian minority here. We demand reciprocity.

We hope that the present regime in Italy will continue the policy of its democratic governments: good-neighborly relations with Croatia and Slovenia. We hope that they will respect all agreements and treaties signed after World War II. Croatia is open and ready and wants relations which are as friendly and wide-ranging as possible with democratic Italy. It is prepared to discuss all issues regarding the rights of an ethnic minority but as I said this must also be true for the Croatian minority in Italy.

I believe that in democratic Italy the kind of wisdom will prevail which led Italy out of fascism into the fold of the world's democratic countries which also signed these agreements upon which we are today building our mutual relations. Consequently, if we do not attach too much importance to what is being articulated as an irredentist and imperialist drive toward Istria, Rijeka, and Dalmatia, we nevertheless must not ignore such phenomena precisely because they are being linked with Serbian imperialism and its anti-Croatian policies in Croatia and the area of the former Yugoslavia as a whole. This is why we favor a situation whereby we can develop in every way, by all means, friendly and good-neighborly relations with the Italian people and the democratic Italy.

Ladies and gentlemen, my dear friends, as I have said, Croatia has won friends and allies in the whole world due to the stability of its democratic system and the correctness of its policies. Today, Croatia can say that it has friends and allies in the world's most powerful power, in the United States. We also have friendly relations with huge China at the other end of the world. We also have friendly relations with the European Union [EU] and friendly relations with the main EU countries and with Islamic countries. Croatia's international position is such that it also safeguards the stability of Croatia's internal development.

In economic terms, despite all the consequences of war, Croatia has in a sense performed an economic miracle to

the surprise and bafflement of serious people and those who were not sympathetic to us. Our government has managed to slash the inflation rate to an extent achieved by few countries in Europe. Or rather, none of the ex-socialist countries has managed to do so to the same extent. We have today our national currency, the kuna which is already a stable convertible currency [applause]. This national currency of ours has already been included among the world's financial indicators. Croatia is still, understandably, facing its main task—to liberate its occupied areas [applause].

As I said, we are going to continue our policy; on our part we are going to do everything to bring about a peaceful incorporation in agreement with the international community and with its support and that of the United Nations, so the UN Security Council resolutions on the incorporation of these areas into Croatia can be implemented peacefully. Understandably, if these efforts remain futile and if the international community and the UN turn out to be helpless then the Croatian people as a sovereign people will be capable and will know how to use all means to restore the constitutional and legal order across their entire homeland. [applause]

Let me finish, please. I understand the impatience and justified anger of our refugees, from Baranja and Vukovar to Rijeka or Dubrovnik, to Banija and Kordun. At the same time I call on them: be patient for a little while, trust this Croatian state leadership who knew how to establish an independent and sovereign Croatia, who knew how to win friends and allies. We shall know how to do everything possible to liberate Croatia's occupied areas without casualties.

We are also going to do everything we have to—if we have to—to help you return to your homes, to the ruins of your burned-down houses. We are going to help you restore them. I have been meeting you all over Croatia. Understandably, you cannot remain homeless while Serbian occupation forces reign on Croatian territory.

Consequently, the sovereign and democratic Croatia has known and will know what it wants. We needed friends and allies in the world and we knew how to win them. On the other hand, the world's democratic forces need a stable and democratic Croatia. This is the kind of Croatia that will remain because the Croatian people have realized that they have restored Croatian sovereignty through their sacrifices and skills in all Croatian regions, in all Croatian areas, counties.

What remains is what I said was their immediate task. But this Croatia has its position in the international order. This Croatia is today respected by everyone, including those who at some stage did not want it to exist.

The antifascist struggle of the Croatian people in the whole of Croatia, including Istria, hugely contributed to the very foundations of this democratic Croatia. Without the contribution of the antifascist struggle there would be no independent and democratic Croatia today. This is something the democratic Croatian authorities will bear in mind.

Likewise, members of Croatia's antifascist movement in World War II must bear in mind the fact that Croatia is preoccupied with the problems of its current war and with everything else we are facing today, so it has not been able to pay enough attention to those members of the antifascist movement who were partly in the service of Croatia's state freedom and Croatian statehood idea, just as they were also—if they were members of the Serbian people—gripped by the idea that a Croatian state should not be allowed to exist. [sentence as heard]

Consequently, these members of the antifascist movement of Serbian nationality must also understand this reality; they must understand that the essence of antifascist struggle in Croatia was the struggle for Croatian freedom, for Croatian statehood. I want to recall that even the Serbian units in Banija and Kordun were flying the Croatian flag. This is the essential feature which decisively characterized the antifascist movement of Croatia. This is why we have incorporated antifascism into the foundations of Croatian freedom, Croatian statehood.

Likewise, all members of the antifascist struggle must understand that they must get rid of their notions if what they saw in it was a struggle against some kind of independent Croatian state. This desperation of the Croatian people in World War II, this very complex situation, was to some extent clearly reflected in the situation brought about in the wake of the proclamation of independent Croatia, in the rebellion of the Serbs from Knin and elsewhere, who were directly instructed by the Yugoslav communist army and Belgrade. Consequently, all of this is a reality suggesting that we must bear in mind these problems in their entirety, including the antifascist struggle as well as the struggle for Croatian freedom and a Croatian state.

Hence, let us pay eternal tribute to the honour and glory of members of the antifascist struggle of Croatia and of Istria within the same context. Long live Croatian Istria in this democratic and sovereign Croatia.

Serbian Leader Reacts

LD2306173794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1635 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Zagreb, 23 June (TANJUG)—Milan Djukic, chairman of the Serb National Party [SNS] in Zagreb, today sent an open letter to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, warning him that his speech in Pazin [Istria] yesterday, on the occasion of antifascist struggle day, was "fraught with insults to the Serbian people in Croatia."

"Your speech will hardly contribute to the return of the Croatian Serbs' confidence in the Croatian authorities," Djukic said. "You have hurt the Serb people in Croatia, who will not forgive you or endorse parts of your Pazin

speech as the truth," Djukic stressed in his letter, telling Tudjman that he indeed was a historian, "but not as authoritative as to be in a position to change the history of these parts." Historians have been at odds as to where the first shots of resistance were fired in Croatia, but 27 July 1941 certainly cannot be described as "the date when chetniks from Knin and Bosnia rose in rebellion," Djukic wrote in his letter.

Tudjman Chairs Session of Council of Istria

LD2306205094 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] [Announcer] A session of the Council for Istria was held on Brijuni today under the chairmanship of Franjo Tudjman, the president of the republic. Zdravko Kleva reporting.

[Kleva] [Video shows Brijuni and the meeting] Assessing the international position of Croatia and Istria and problems at the local level, it was seen as useful to form an advisory body. Consequently, journalists were told after the constituent session in Brijuni, the Council for Istria was formed. Today's session was attended by 12 of the 17 members appointed by Franjo Tudjman, the head of state. Other state officials also attended.

[Begin recording] [Nevio Sesto, not further identified] We know that two people are out of the country and they could not attend. Two more people apologized for not being able to attend. Only one member has not turned up without a word.

[Unidentified correspondent] There was one more member.

[Sesto] Yes, we received a request to extend our membership, that is, that a member of the Istrian County branch of the Association of Croatian Volunteers in the War for the Homeland wanted to join us, and we accepted that. We expect the president of the republic to soon appoint Mr. Ivan Pletikosa as a new member of the Council for Istria. [end recording]

[Kleva] The Council for Istria will be active in five groups which will propose solutions for strategic issues in Istria—from demographic issues and those concerning culture and education to economic issues. Advisory groups will be set up to work on relations between the state administration and local government. The council will present its proposals to county and central state authorities.

[Begin Monsignor Josip Pavlisic, president of the Council for Istria, recording] On my part, I believe that it is useful to give a good word or thought to those who seek our advice in order to coordinate the needs and wishes of the head of the republic and local bodies. We are not advising political parties, but people holding certain posts. The president of the republic is the president of all Croats and people living on Croatian territory. We decided that we had to take that into account, and our actions, discussions, and advice will not refer to a party or the opposition, but how best to achieve the best conditions for development and improvement of living conditions. [end recording]

[Kleva] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman invited representatives of the local public and political life to a luncheon in honor of the members of the Council for Istria today. The mayors of Istrian towns and Istrian County Prefect Luciano Delbianco apologized and did not attend the luncheon.

Tudjman's 'Ustasha' Currency Assailed

94BA0319A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jun 94 pp 26-27

[Article by Gojko Marinkovic, AIM: "From the Croatian Dinar to the Croatian Kuna"]

[Text] Croatian President Tudjman has once again been proving his obstinacy, arbitrariness, and messianism, but at the same time his reputation as a dubious historian and scholar, because he has used his power and a raft of pseudoarguments to impose on Croatia a new currency, as of 30 May, Statehood Day, which is called the kuna.

There were no warnings or assurances that could dissuade him from his intention: "The president of the republic," Dr. Ivo Banac, well-known Croatian historian at Yale, the prestigious American university, said the other day, "cannot go to Knin or to Glina, but he can impose the ustasha monetary unit. Entire barrels of learned ink have already been consumed to prove what cannot be proven, that is, that the kuna is a living tradition of the Croatian people—not a Pavelic invention—the kuna was used in the 13th century, the kuna is on the Slavonian crest, and it is our most original kuna. This pseudoscientific battle of wits deserves only scorn. This is the shabbiest invention of tradition with the difference that the invented Scotch tartans (tribal weaves) are something that can be turned into money, while the only thing that can be paid with the kuna is Pavelic's bills, which were always anything but Croatian. We who all our lives in distant parts of the world have been defending Croatia from what we might call kunism, can now give thanks to Tudjman, the former political commissar, for this particularly pregnant act of reconciliation. We will see how long it takes before Dr. Tudjman apologizes for this brainstorm. The 'only' pity is that his *'Trackless...'* and kunas are paid for by others, for example, the refugees from Vukovar or Konavale, whom Serbian propaganda has always represented as coauthors of *'Trackless...,'* or troglodytes wearing the fur of the marten [kuna]."

The man who compares himself to Jesus, because on two occasions in past days he has declared "Even among Christ's 12 apostles, one betrayed him, the other denied him, and the rest, but for one, did not follow him on his road to the cross," thus decided that the Croats shall no longer precede money amounts by HRD [Croatian

dinar], but by HRK [Croatian kuna]. Those who attempt to point out the harmfulness of this decision of his, that is, to change the name of the Croatian kruna [crown], which had previously been adopted by vote, to the kuna, he simply calls enemies and traitors, because "the kuna will be the proof of Croatian sovereignty and the stability of the Croatian economy. Croatia had a leadership with a clear objective in which the people believed."

The Croatian Jesus

What is done is done, and for the present, unfortunately, there is nothing more that can be changed: The German mark [DM] will be 3.7 kunas, and this dangerous little animal will be divided into a smaller unit—the lipa [linden]. But in addition to the crucial issue of the name, there are a number of others. One is again in the sphere of history, and the other economic. That is, many people, after analyzing the persons and cities that appear on the new Croatian bank notes, have been calling attention to a number of illogical things, that is, a system which stubbornly wants to impose just one view of the Croatian past. On the other hand, numerous experts are wondering whether this is really the right time to remove three zeros and adopt the real currency (the HRD was temporary scrip) and whether the reasons are not really political and ceremonial?

The nine persons on the eight bank notes—according to many—including Banac, whom we have already cited, have an exceedingly pronounced semantic weight. Petar Zrinski and Krsto Frankopan (the 5-kuna note), Juraj Dobrila (10), Josip Jelacic (20), Ivan Gundulic (50), Ivan Mazuranic (100), Stjepan Radic (200), Marko Marulic (500), and Ante Starcevic (1,000) are all of them (except Radic to some extent) figures from the quite distant Croatian past who are supposed to demonstrate the course of the idea of the Croatian state. This choice demonstrates the need of a small state to prove itself powerful, to prove that it also had its great men, its bans and imperial generals, and, of course, its Father of the Homeland.

There was no place on the new bank notes for a Rudjer Boskovic, who until yesterday was on all the denominations of the temporary dinar? Not a single woman was found, but it is not that they could not have found an important Croatian woman. For example: Ivana Brlic-Mazuranic, Dora Pejacevic, Cvijeta Zuzoric.... Tudjman himself explained why, for instance, Ljudevit Gaj, or Strosmajer, Frano Supilo, or even Vladko Macek are not on a bank note. Demonstrating once again his incredible unfamiliarity with history, or, at least, his strange and monstrous interpretation of it, in a ceremonial interview with the editors in chief of the Croatian media (but chosen by him) he nervously declared: "Who told me that they reproached us for not having put Gaj or Strosmajer on the new bank notes? All we need is to do more to spread Illyrianism and Yugoslavism."

The Front and the Back of the Coin

One can only imagine what the "Croatian Jesus" would answer to the question of why there is no Miroslav Krleza, August Cesarac, or Nikola Tesla on the kunas (although they would probably turn in their graves because of the name). Tudjman has proven for the umpteenth time that he is not bound by the Croatian Constitution nor by the program of his pseudoparty. After all, the Constitution clearly states that among other things Croatian statehood is based "on establishment of the foundations of state sovereignty in the period of World War II, expressed contrary to proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia [NDH], in decisions of ZAVNOH [Regional Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia], and then in the constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia, and in the constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia." And in the program of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] it is written that it is also based on the spadework done by the Croatian left.

On the back of the bank note are the city of Varazdin, the arena in Pula, the Vukovar pigeon, Dubrovnik, the Rijeka Cathedral, Osijek, Diocletian's Palace in Split, and Zagreb—the Cathedral and the Monument to King Tomislav. The justification offered for this decision has to do with Croatian geography; that is, the four largest cities and four cities on the outer edge are represented. At first glance this "holds water," but again it is a question of the same criteria, only this time they are a bit more confused, since what are the Arena and Diocletian's Palace doing here anyway? And if the creators of the kuna had taken some other criterion except for monumentality, whereby they repeated the mistake they made in choosing the people, perhaps the Holy Cross in Nin, Saint Donat in Zadar, Viseslav's sacristy (which up to now has been on all the dinar scrip), and even Knin (how sacrilegious it sounds) might have turned up on one of the bank notes, because the Croatian Government is thus obstinately repeating that Knin is an old royal city? The front and the back of the Croatian kunas have actually exposed the mindset of the Croatian ruler, which, incidentally, he was not concealing even the other day when he appeared in a military uniform for the first time in public, which is probably the first step toward self-proclamation as general or generalissimo, and when he turned medieval Medvedgrad into some Altar of Croatian Freedom known only to him. But if the Croats had to once again swallow the dumpling which Tudjman thrust upon them, many are wondering what they have got in economic terms with the kuna and the lipas? Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic, who is still declaring unlimited loyalty to Tudjman and has not wondered for a moment whether the kuna should be inaugurated right now, also had this to say a few days ago: "The real problems and the wave of bankruptcies that will be coming soon will affect entire branches of the economy, because the structure of the economy which Croatia has today is not tenable. Only now will we see whether we have the strength and will to carry out the

anti-inflation program on which cooperation with international financial institutions depends."

Political Decision

Up to now, the Croatian Government has boasted disdainfully how it has managed to halt inflation, and when recently its deputy prime minister was advised that this is a simple operation, he replied: "Well, if it is simple, why didn't others do it?" The creator of the "Croatian economic miracle" seems to have forgotten that even a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where inflation was measured in millions of percentage points, managed to achieve domestic convertibility in just one day. Many economic indicators warn that the Croatian economy has no chance of that kind of rapid recovery and that up to now the government has only carried out the anti-inflation program, but it has not even begun the stabilization program, as Valentic himself has declared so clearly. This is best indicated by the figures on the drastic decline of industrial output, the drop in exports and imports, and the deficit amounting to about $100 million.... Dr. Vladimir Veselica, member of the HDZ and a professor in the School of Economics at Zagreb University, recently judged that the "collapsing curve of economic activity, unresolved property relations, that is, the incomplete and highly questionable privatization, without whose completion there can be no restructuring nor development of the economy, constitute a weak support for real convertibility of the first sovereign Croatian currency." Another economist (who incidentally is a member of the first Croatian government, from which he withdrew because of his attitude toward privatization), Dr. Drazen Kalodjera, is still more precise: "The prerequisites have not been created for introduction of the kuna. I think that the change in the money system and denomination did not come at the right moment. This is a political decision which has an economically neutral effect."

Dr. Ivo Banac is convinced (nor is he alone) that Tudjman will again have to apologize for yet another historical brainstorm and invention as he did in the case of the Jews and what he wrote about them in his *Trackless*.... Ivica Racan, president of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia [SDSH], says: "The new money will sooner or later pay the price of this illusion concerning the great success against inflation, regardless of what it is called. Perhaps it is not such a bad thing for the odium to fall on a bank note with an inappropriate name."

UN: Serbian Presence Around Zadar Reduced

LD2306134394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1224 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Knin, 23 Jun (TANJUG)—By 1000 today the Serb military had considerably reduced its presence in the area of the village of Kakma near Benkovac, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] representatives in Sector South stressed at a news conference today in Knin. They made it clear that there remained five armed soldiers and three to four unarmed soldiers.

The situation in this village, 12 kilometers south-west of Benkovac, which is situated within the so-called buffer zone and which is regarded by both sides as "a sensitive area," was described by the sector commander Czech General Rostislav Kotil and head of civilian affairs Enrico Aguillar, and press spokesman Alun Roberts.

In their words, this was a very serious violation of the cease-fire agreement since about 100 Serb soldiers entered the buffer zone without giving any notice. Roberts said that UNPROFOR's Canadian troops had denied neither access to the waterworks system nor passage through the village of Kakma, while military observers have not noticed any concentration of Croatian forces, nor have they seen any relocation of heavy weaponry near Biograd. He told the press that yesterday a member of the negotiating team, Colonel Duburg, had visited Knin and met General Mile Novakovic, the head of Krajina's central commission for the implementation of the Zagreb agreement.

They agreed to hold a meeting this afternoon between Gen. Novakovic and Bertrand de Lapresle, the UNPROFOR commander for the former Yugoslavia, probably in Topusko. A meeting of the central commission was also suggested in order to normalize the situation as soon as possible.

Sector Commander Gen. Kotil was speaking about a meeting he held in Kakma yesterday with Colonel Alavanja, the commander of the North Dalmatian Corps of the Krajina army and the commander of the unit that had entered Kakma. According to him, he suggested that mixed patrols, including UNPROFOR and the militia of the republic of Serb Krajina, be set up so they could patrol this area. He agreed that all repairs to the waterworks should stop. Kotil expressed satisfaction with the latest improved situation and stressed that he understood how sensitive the Kakma area was, given the fact that it supplied water to a number of towns.

Asked by a reporter whether UNPROFOR would withdraw its armored carriers from this area—at the moment there are as many as 25 of them [carriers]—he said that it was too early to talk about UNPROFOR's further activities but he could not accept any claim that UNPROFOR forces occupied Serbian villages.

Two Polish Soldiers Killed, Two Injured

LD2306174394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] Two Polish soldiers from the UN forces have died and two others were injured as a result of a mine explosion in Croatia, the spokesman of the United Nations' peace forces reports. The incident happened at about 1100 in the northern sector of the Croatian territory controlled by the Serbian separatists, and which is

under the UN forces supervision. The UN spokesman has not yet given any details of this incident.

Serbs Retake Territory in Separation Zone

LD2206180594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1715 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Text] Knin, 22 Jun (TANJUG)—Members of the Serbian army of Krajina returned to positions in the area of the village of Kakma near Benkovac, along the Croatian-Krajina separation line, an area that has been designated by the Zagreb agreement as being within the zone of separation.

This was also confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Marinko Gajic, deputy commander of the Serbian army of Krajina, who explained the move as a measure of caution against increased Croatian threats to the effect that they would forcibly capture the water springs in this village. The source supplying Benkovac with water has been controlled by the Serbian army of Krajina until recently, but became part of the so-called zone of separation in accordance with the Zagreb agreement. This area is now under the jurisdiction of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] Canadian battalion. Allan Roberts, spokesman for Sector South, told TANJUG's correspondent that the situation is being assessed "very carefully," and that consultations are being conducted at the moment, "so nothing specific can be said."

UN Envoy Visits UNPROFOR Units in Krajina

LD2206115894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1122 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Text] Vukovar, 22 Jun (TANJUG)—Yasushi Akashi, UN secretary general's special envoy for former Yugoslavia, and General Milan Celeketic, commander of the Serb Krajina army, visited units in Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem today, according to the press center of the Serb Krajina army's main headquarters.

Yasushi Akashi visited UNPROFOR's units in Beli Manastir and Vukovar and General Celeketic visited the zone of responsibility of the [Serb Krajina] Slavonia-Baranja Corps as part of his regular activities.

In a statement for the republic of Serb Krajina television, Gen Celeketic gave a positive assessment of combat readiness for defense of the republic of Serb Krajina.

Turkish UN Troops Arrive in Split

LD2206135194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 1203 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Text] Two Turkish vessels carrying 250 out of the 415 Turkish UN soldiers sailed into the Split port this morning. The troops brought in 50 armored personnel carriers and other equipment. The rest of the Turkish troops are to be flown into Split by 27 June. Those troops are to be deployed in the south-eastern sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

'Status Quo' on Border Reported

AU2406093694 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 24 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Status Quo on Border Line"]

[Text] The situation with Serbian troops stationed on the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] territory near Kriva Palanka is in a status quo. The two countries' soldiers are positioned only few hundred meters away from each other. There are no incidents and the region is regularly flown over by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] helicopters. The anxiety of the local population loosens, but farmers are prevented from cultivating their land as it is on the territory presently usurped by Serbian troops.

Albanian Parties Discuss Census, Request Delay

AU2406101194 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 24 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Albanian Parties Meeting on Census"]

[Text] The leadership of PDP [the Party of Democratic Prosperity], i.e. presidents of the Tetovo party branch along with Albanian ministers and parliament deputies held a meeting behind closed doors to discuss the party's view on the census. They also informed reporters of the essence of recent talks with representatives of the NDP [the Peoples' Democratic Party], Albanian Democratic Alliance—Liberal Party, and SDA [Party of Democratic Action]-Islamic Road.

Meantime, the Parliament Press Service informed yesterday of a proposal by 6 PDP deputies for urgent changes in the census. They suggested a six-months delay of the census, i.e. proposed for the census to being December 1, 1994 and to end January 7, 1995.

Albanian Clerks Boycott Public Census

AU2406101294 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 24 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Census '94"]

[Text] Although the census entered its 3rd day, Albanian census clerks are still not doing their part of the job in some cities (Kumanovo, Kicevo, Debar). The census has also not yet started in the part of Makedonski Brod, inhabited by the Macedonian Muslims and the Turks. The situation in Tetovo is the same despite the fact that all preparations are completed, because of Article 30 of the Census Law. The census in Gostivar has also not begun although the training of census clerks has. The operation in Debar did start but the census committees asked for a delay. In parts of the Skopje central settlement inhabited by heterogeneous populations, census clerks refuse to go in twos. In all remaining cities, the census operation is carried out normally.

Meanwhile, representatives of PDP [the Party of Democratic Prosperity] and the Albanian Liberal Alliance-Democratic Party met with the Council of Europe's experts in parliament yesterday. The resident of the expert team (Verner Haug) stated there were no objective reasons to boycott the census and parties refusing to take part in it would have to take on the entire responsibility, regardless of their reasons. As for demands by Albanian parties for postponement of the end deadline, he said it might be a solution for overcoming all current problems. He pointed out it would be better to have a little longer-lasting census than to have no census at all. However, he stressed this was only a suggestion on which the Macedonian Government and parliament will have to bring a final decision about.

Committee Rejects VMRO-DPMNE Claims

AU2306184894 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 23 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Intelligence Agency—Clean"]

[Text] Yesterday, the Parliament Committee for control over the work of the State Intelligence Agency announced the results of its surveillance of the agency documents. The Committee confirmed the intelligence service had not undertaken any operative or technical methods towards VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], nor towards any other political party. The document presented to the public by Ljupco Georgievski is a forgery, as there is no original or any other document in the intelligence documentation under that number and date. The intelligence does not undertake measures and methods, but on individuals connected with foreign intelligence services or because of activities aimed at endangering the constitutional establishment of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], the Committee report states.

Minister Offers Resignation Over Loan Scandal

AU2306161994 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] We have just learned unofficially that Justice Minister Miha Kozinc has offered his resignation to Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek because of the affair with the government housing loans, issued under favorable conditions. His action is not in response to the opposition party demands that have accompanied the outbreak of the affair, since the justice minister allegedly offered his resignation on Monday [20 June], immediately after the publication of the names of the recipients of loans.

There have been many pressures for his replacement in the past, however, none of these demands referred to his work as justice minister. It is not known yet whether Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek will accept his resignation. Last night Drnovsek merely stated that he would demand a report from the incumbent service and resort to replacements if need be.

ΩKucan-Tudjman Meeting Assessed

94P20912A

[Editorial Report] A 7 June meeting in Zagreb between Slovene President Milan Kucan and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on bilateral issues has been the subject of much discussion in the Slovene and Croatian press.

The 9 June issue of the Ljubljana independent daily DELO reported that the day after his return from Zagreb, Kucan told reporters at a Ljubljana news conference that his visit had been "useful" and that he had achieved his "goal"—to give impetus to Slovene-Croatian negotiations on unresolved bilateral issues, which range from border disputes to stagnating economic relations. Although the presidents did not try to find "concrete" solutions to the specific problems, Kucan mentioned as particularly aggravating issues the Piran Bay dispute and deteriorating trade relations. He said that the best solution would be to compromise or, absent an agreement, accept the status quo. The worst possible option, in his opinion, would be "to ignore the problems" or "force unilateral solutions." He remarked that he was not "completely convinced" that the Slovene Government was aware of the importance of Slovenia's relations with its neighbor or that it had formulated a strategy for dealing with the unresolved issues.

Kucan stressed the importance of Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic's scheduled July visit to Ljubljana, during which he and his Slovene counterpart Janez Drnovsek will probably tackle the major problems: the border in the Piran Bay, the construction of the Phyrn highway, the Ljubljanska Banka's debt to Croatian depositors, numerous property claims by nationals of both countries, the Krsko nuclear power plant, and the trade decline. In Kucan's view, the upcoming Slovene-Croatian talks should be guided by the following principles: to seek "just" and "mutually satisfying" solutions and to respect the "equality" of the two partners. Kucan expressed willingness to take part in formulating the Slovene positions in preparation for the July meeting, DELO reported.

In the same issue of DELO, commentator Veso Stojanov assessed Kucan's meeting with Tudjman as "above all, a useful exchange of opinions" on how to get Slovene-Croatian relations out of their dead-end street. While he agreed with the official statements that the normalization of relations is "of vital interest to both countries," Stojanov suspected that "threats from Rome" against both countries also played a part in the talks, since it is important for Slovenia and Croatia to formulate a joint strategy toward Italy. Stojanov noted that the approach of the tourist season makes it especially urgent for Croatia that tensions be removed. At the same time, he criticized the Slovene Government, especially the Foreign Ministry, for lacking a foreign policy strategy, reflected in "complete indifference" toward solving the problems with Croatia.

In an earlier commentary published in the 8 June DELO, Stojanov questioned whether Kucan's unofficial visit to Croatia would contribute to better cooperation, while agreeing with Tudjman's and Kucan's statements that the present relations between Slovenia and Croatia "do not suit the interests of either state." Stojanov pointed out that the short history of Slovene-Croatian relations "is full of meetings and negotiations at different levels—disputed issues, however, remain unresolved." Stojanov blamed the impasse mostly on a "lack of interest by the neighbors or their nonobservance of agreements and promises." In his opinion, the talks can be judged successful only when "Zagreb, in fact, shows a readiness to normalize relations with Ljubljana."

A commentary in the 8 June issue of the Maribor (Slovenia) daily VECER stated that President Kucan had to show "firmness" in his talks with President Tudjman because Slovene foreign policy toward Croatia had been "by and large unsuccessful," resulting in quarrels and finger-pointing on the Slovene domestic political scene. An important new development pointed out by the commentator is the fact that, from now on, Slovenia will not "stand by idly" if Croatia attempts to "further complicate already serious problems," as Kucan, according to VECER, told Tudjman, who has the final say in Croatia.

The 9 June issue of the Zagreb daily VJESNIK noted the good will of both sides toward solving Slovene-Croatia problems, "if not out of great love," then out of common political and economic interests, among which VJESNIK listed the wish of both countries to be integrated into the European Union and a perceived common threat from Italy regarding Istria. The announced visit to Slovenia by Prime Minister Valentic was viewed by VJESNIK as a step toward improving Croat-Slovene relations.

The independent Rijeka daily NOVI LIST, in its 9 June issue, was critical of both sides, for extolling their own virtues and arguing over a "dry river bed," forgetting that they both live in the shadow of Italy, "an unpredictable neighbor."

The 8 June issue of the Split daily SLOBODNA DALMACIJA predicted that the "two presidents will not find any concrete solutions," not only because the Slovene president has less authority to negotiate than his Croatian counterpart but also because Slovene-Croatian relations have been neglected and stalled by both sides for a long time. The paper said it would consider the meeting a success if both sides expressed a willingness "to resolve the problems," such as the border and property issues, and "to create a good atmosphere," which would then lead to meetings of expert groups and meetings between Valentic and his Slovene counterpart, Janez Drnovsek.

Federal

Protest To UN Over Actions by Albanians

LD2306200594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1844 GMT 23 Jun 94

[Text] New York, June 23 (TANJUG)—Albanian police have injured several men, women and children in attempts forcibly to resettle the Serb and Montenegrin population from the villages Startlad and Boric on the Albanian border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, warned a protest by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry which was sent on this occasion to United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

The protest was circulated as an official U.N. document on Thursday [23 June].

The document, which was presented by Yugoslav Ambassador to the U.N. Dragomir Djokic, said that members of the Serb and Montenegrin peoples, whose native country is Yugoslavia, are being forcibly moved from the Albania-Yugoslavia border area. Such actions by the Albanian authorities are a gross violation of human and civil rights—the right to physical integrity, choice of place of residence and the inviolablity of personal and private property, said the protest.

The Yugoslav ministry assesssed that this is a deliberately conceived policy aimed at breaking up the ethnic compactness of Serbs and Montenegrins in Albania, especially in territories towards the Yugoslav-Albanian border. Such actions by [word indistinct] contrary to its obligations stemming from its membership in tha U.N. and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), said the protest. The Yugoslav Government urges the Albanian authorities to stop this forcible resettling of Serbs and Montenegrins and to respect the rights of national minorities in agreement with their obligations and relevant CSCE documents.

Kosovo

Albanians Boycott Enrollment in State Schools

LD2206140194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1303 GMT 22 Jun 94

[Text] Belgrade, June 22 (TANJUG)—Not a single ethnic Albanian has applied for state secondary school entry exams, according to Zika Nedeljkovic, Serbian Education Ministry official in Kosovo and Metohija. Nedeljkovic told the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES on Wednesday [22 June] that, 'We are aware that extra-legal exams are being held for ethnic Albanian secondary school pupils, with enrollment probably taking place in private homes.'

This is the third year that ethnic Albanians have boycotted state secondary schools, even though classes in Albanian have been organized for 12,500 pupils and in Turkish for 240 pupils, the daily said. There has been a strong separatist movement among ethnic Albanians in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija for decades. Leaders of the movement demand the annexation of the province by neighbouring Albania.

Ethnic Albanians backing the separatist movement boycott the laws of Serbia and Yugoslavia, refusing to go to school, to work or to pay taxes. They did not vote in the 1990 and 1992 multiparty elections. Ethnic Albanian students boycott school classes and university lectures to avoid the Serbian and Yugoslav school curriculum. They attend illegal classes in private homes and use the curriculum of neighbouring Albania.

Yugoslav and Serbian officials have unsuccessfully appealed to ethnic Albanian intellectuals in the provice to oppose the separatists and to support a return to state schools. The result is that generations of ethnic Albanians are unable to find work because they have not obtained secondary school certificates. The Yugoslav Constitution guarantees civil rights regardless of ethnic origin. Ethnic Albanians can attend classes and lectures in Albanian and have newspapers, magazines, radio and tv programmes in Albanian.

There are 1,400 schools for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, 60 education centres and university lectures are offered in Albanian.

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